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ABSTRACT...
Title of Dissertation:

Regulating Vessel Traffic Service (VTS) To Mitigate
Maritime Accidents at Port Approaches

Degree:

MSc

This dissertation is a study that intends to show how regulating VTS can mitigate
maritime accidents at port approaches. Ships (flag State) and ports are not the same
nationalities, thus they need harmonized regulations. This thesis aims to identify and
analyse different sources regulating the VTS domain at the IMO, IALA and its member
States to provide an insight into the way VTS are regulated, and the implication of such
regulations on mitigating maritime accidents at port approaches.
Through an explanatory inductive research was carried out using the qualitative research
method while utilising a semi-structured interviewing technique and questionnaires plus
observations to collect primary data. At the same time secondary data were used to
conclude the findings.
The study concluded that risks at port approaches are always in a state of flux and
require a proactive approach; regulating VTS functions will eliminate uncertainties and
prevent accidents, so there is a need to regulate VTS centres in a harmonized way and to
ensure high standard VTS are maintained throughout the VTS domain around the world.
Regulating VTS, is an international quest and a national obligation toward protecting
VTS stakeholder interests in view of maintaining a high standard of maritime safety.
VTS benchmarking / KPI will justify its importance in mitigating maritime accidents
within VTS areas and at port approaches. VTS centers are not immune to prosecutions if
an accident takes place inside a VTS area due to negligence and due care on the part of
the VTSO. This requires a focus on leadership, strategy, internal process, customers and
meaning-full ROI in order to yield the desired results.
KEYWRODS: VTS, IMO, IALA, KPI, VTSO, Risks Mitigation, Port Approaches,
Legal Liabilities, Regulating, Maritime Accidents.
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CHAPTER

1

INTRODUCTION

This chapter will shed light on the subject of Vessel Traffic Service (VTS) and
the study to be undertaken while introducing the research outline. Furthermore, VTS
general information and background, significance and objectives of the research,
research questions, limitations, overview of the dissertation will be presented.

1.1

VTS general information and background
VTS have been around for a long time, from simple local port radar in the 1960s

to more organized ones in the 1980s; the increase in number and size (plus increase of
ship‘s speed) of both ships and ports around the world, coupled with commercial
demand for information accessibility around the clock, invoked radar (VTS)
manufactures to compete for market share by introducing a more sophisticated VTS
system that can cater for today‘s market. The International Maritime Organization
(IMO), being the responsible body for maritime safety, realized the importance of VTS
in reducing maritime accidents around the world, addressed the VTS issue through
SOLAS, Chapter V, regulation 12, while leaving other details to IMO guidelines and
IALA recommendations. Many VTS centers are available around the world, the majority
of which are seen as a port / traffic coordinator at port approaches just before picking up
the sea or harbour pilot to go alongside. Ships (flag State) and ports are not the same
nationalities, thus the need for harmonized regulations. Ships are regulated via IMO
conventions, but the problem is the VTS around the world. Currently some countries
follow IMO guidelines issued through Resolution A.857(20) of 1997, while others
apparently follow simple administrative arrangements. The recent grounding of the
motor tanker ―Maria M‖ just outside Gothenburg VTS area in 2009 and the grounding of
MV Alva on 17th August 2011, bring about the question of ―could the VTSO intervene
in this instant to prevent the grounding? or leave it, because it is outside the VTS areas.
The officer is in the dilemma of what if something goes wrong? Regulating such
uncertainty will bring about the desired change towards mitigating maritime risks.
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1.2

Significance and objectives of the research.
Maritime administration are seeking risk mitigation options to keep maritime

accidents under control. Having VTS hardware is not sufficient to realise its full
potentials. The research will highlight the shortfall of having harmonized regulations
regarding the implementation of VTS around the world especially in the new era of
ports‘ privatization. The term ―world class port‖ is sought to include having a VTS, yet
developing nations are apparently unable to regulate such vital safety element, while the
private sector is more cost conscious when installing a VTS that meets the concession
agreement and lacks the State expectations / obligations. In most cases, it is left to the
operating companies to run the system without due regard to Port and Coastal State
obligations as set in the relevant conventions. The matter is so confusing in emerging
markets (ports), which focus only on the commercial aspects of the port, rather than on
the maritime safety aspects at port approaches, which could be too costly for a company
to take on; furthermore, this is a state‘s problem in the first instant.
Nevertheless, national and international oil companies are exceeding the requirements of
a VTS as set in the relevant instruments, yet they apparently act without a national
regulatory framework in place, especially in some Middle Eastern and developing
countries. Some states will keep marine operations under their arm while others will
include them in the concession package to make it more attractive for investors. In both
cases, there are many assumptions in regulating the VTS, which has unfortunately been
bridged by the VTS equipment manufacturers (similar to IACS role) which will cover
operational and technical matters.
Regulating VTS will in no doubt assure the ships‘ master of his obligation with regard to
measures taken to mitigate risks during port approaches. This will also assure others of
the State commitment towards implementing IMO instruments as audited via Voluntary
IMO Member State Audit Scheme (VIMSAS). Oil companies (national or international)
or major ports operator working in a State cannot work in isolation from the State
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regulatory system. The State (Maritime Administration) must have an integrated system
to cater for all VTS (costal, port or TSS) under its jurisdiction to ensure that a safety-net
is created to mitigate the risk of a maritime accident.
This thesis aims to identify and analyse different sources regulating VTS
(technical/operational and legislative) at the IMO, IALA and its member States to
provide an insight on the way VTS are regulated. Furthermore, the study will examine
current methods of managing ship traffic movements around the world, and maritime
accidents involving VTS interaction with ships. The overall objective of this thesis is to
highlight the way VTS are regulated by international bodies namely IMO and IALA,
and also the implication of such regulations on mitigating maritime accidents at port
approaches. The research will enhance the researcher‘s VTS knowledge, at the same
time enrich the researcher‘s ability to follow today's maritime safety trend in the field of
VTS regulating. This research can be very useful in developing a conceptual regulatory
framework for VTS centers in quest of maintaining high maritime safety standards.

1.3 Research questions
In order to have a systemic approach, the research will be looking for answers to the
following questions:
1. What are the risks that need to be mitigated in areas of port approaches?
2. How can VTS (operators) be involved in accident development and what
is their liability?
3. Are there any KPI or benchmarks for VTS to be regarded as good for
mitigating maritime accidents?
Answers will be sought to the following questions among others;
The first question will study and analyze the risks/hazards which need to be mitigated at
port approaches as perceived by the study participants and the author‘s experience.
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Although, certain risks are easy to spot, others may spring out from accidents analysis
and individual experience. However, it is also essential to point out that the study will
not carry out a ―risk assessment‖ study. The information will be a help in showing how
different competent VTS authorities around the world mitigate such risks.
Question two, will examine how a VTSO can be involved in an accident development
instead of preventing it. How participants feel about the VTSO being responsible about
his actions including court case regarding the same will be examined.
Question three, involves finding out how VTS are actually classified by the
stakeholders, namely ship masters and competent VTS authorities.

1.4

Limitations
There are a number of limitations to the present study, which are as listed below:



The main problem is the extent of willingness on the part of the participants to
share information. To deal with this problem, all questionnaires were made
general without names to ensure confidentiality.



Interviews are considered to be one of the most appropriate means of collecting
data regarding the research question. However, because of the time frame and
the ongoing course study, it was left to opportunities (field study trips) more
than arrangement. It is time consuming and may pose a problem to the
participant especially around the issues of confidentiality.



There is little information available about VTS systems in developing countries;
World Maritime University (WMU) attending students were asked to help in
collecting information about their countries.



There was a lack of available books (up to date English VTS books) at WMU, so
this problem was solved using e-books and relaying heavily on the internet.

The low response rate and resulting few samples have severely affected the general
ability of the conclusion that can be drawn.
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1.5

Overview of the dissertation (Chapters’ summary)
This dissertation consists of seven chapters; the summary details are as follows:

Chapter 1, describes the background of the study and includes introduction, significance
and objectives of the research, research questions, limitations, overview and structure of
the dissertation.
Chapter 2, gives a contextual background to the relevant literature underpinning the
dissertation subject to develop a conceptual frame work for ―Regulating VTS to mitigate
maritime accidents at port approaches‖. It includes identification of risks/hazards at port
approaches, layers of regulating VTS and the relationship between maritime accidents
and VTS actions in the eye of courts.
Chapter 3, gives an overview of the important features of the research design and
methodology used which includes identification and criteria of sample (participant),
sources of data collection, instruments used to conduct the research and data analysis
procedures.
Chapter 4, discusses the participant profile, and summarises the study findings
(questionnaire results) in a tabulated as well as in descriptive forms, while connecting
the data collected with the theoretical framework. The research questions answers are
found in this chapter.
Chapter 5, gives an account of the conducted interviews in a summary format.
Chapter 6, discusses the observations and the results of each research question.
Chapter 7, wraps up the dissertation by discussing the conclusions to each research
question and its implications to VTS. It also includes the researcher reflections on the
outcome results, as well as recommendations on the best way to regulate VTS based on
contextual background, findings and benchmarks from around the world. The chapter
also lists the references used together with appendices.
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CHAPTER
2.1

2

CONTEXTUAL BACKGROUND

Introduction.
There are several streams of literature related to the research. However, only the

relevant literature will be given in this chapter to demonstrate the conceptual framework
of the present study, in order to develop the background information necessary for the
interviews, designing the questionnaire and be able to understand how VTS are
regulated around the world to best mitigate the risks of maritime accidents in port
approaches. To achieve this, relevant up to date literature pertaining to VTS structures
and functions, risks/hazards and types of maritime accidents at port approaches, layers
and elements of regulating VTS, relationship between maritime accidents and VTS will
be illustrated in this chapter. Much of the work on the subject of VTS has been done by
IMO, IALA, academics, successful maritime administration and consultants. However,
there are few that have raised the issue of international regulations of VTS in pursuance
of safer port approaches. VTS related IMO and IALA documents, conference
proceedings, peer reviewed journals, ports‘ VTS manuals, text books, research reports,
seminars, periodicals, and internet web sites were used to successfully guide the research

through.
2.2

Overview of VTS structures and functions
The International Maritime Organization (IMO), being the responsible body for

maritime safety, realized the importance of VTS which have made a valuable
contribution to safety of navigation, improved efficiency of traffic flow and the
protection of the marine environment, thus reducing maritime accidents around the
world. The Safety Of Life At Sea (SOLAS) Convention, Chapter V, regulation 12,
addressed the VTS issue in its generic format, while leaving other details to IMO
guidelines (Resolution A.857 (20)) and IALA recommendations.
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2.2.1 VTS definition
VTS is defined as ―a service implemented by a competent authority, designed to
improve the safety and efficiency of vessel traffic and to protect the environment. The
service should have the capability to interact with the traffic and to respond to traffic
situations developing in the VTS area‖ (IMO resolution A.857(20)). SOLAS, urges all
contracting governments planning to establish a VTS, to follow the guidelines developed
by the IMO, and to also endeavour to secure the participation and compliance with the
provision of VTS by ships flaying their flag.
Koburger, (1986) suggests that VTS may also be called Vessel Traffic System, or Vessel
Traffic Management (VTM), the name has been further changed subjective to the
capability and sophistication of the system where it is been called Vessel Traffic
Management Information System (VTMIS) or VTS and Port Management Information
System (PMIS). Whatever the name is, the main concept of VTS remained to be defined
as ― an assortment of personnel, operational procedures, equipment, and regulation,
implemented by a competent authority, assembled for the purpose of marine traffic
management in a given body of water‖. Thus achieving the ultimate goal of mitigating
the risk of maritime accident. This has been complemented by method of enforcement
including fines and judicial proceeding for contravening certain conventions with the
collision regulations being the top one (e.g. Dover Strait, UK). Conceptual framework is
common because every VTS will be different and the complication will vary according
to its type, functions, location of the area it covers and available resources.

2.2.2 Components of VTS
For a VTS to function in its simplest form, there are essential hardware that need
to be in place, namely Radar and Communication systems (VHF, telephone, fax) and an
office (may be a tower). The evolution of VTS since its inception during the 1980s
brought about some compelling needs to keep abreast with shipping and transport
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development. This is mainly due to the increase in ships‘ numbers, size, speed, types and
the cargo they carry together with commercial demands for accurate and up-to date
information. This meant that more hardware is needed to ensure that the increased risk is
better mitigated to avoid maritime accidents in VTS area while facilitating trade and
meeting regulatory requirements.
Today, there are VTS centres equipped with sophisticated radar systems, Automatic
Identification Systems (AIS), direction finders, metrological equipment, Internet, CCTV,
Infra Red Cameras, audio and image recording ability, tidal and current gauges, large
display screens and equipment that allows images to be viewed at national disaster
command centres or regional monitoring centres like EMSA SafeSeaNet1. More and
more equipment is found at VTS centres, like LRIT, GMDSS, Ship Security Alert and
also functions as an MRCC for SAR. This is done because of resources optimisation
including human resources. However, equipment found at any VTS centre will depend
on VTS type, location, available resources, expected results, traffic volume, risk of
maritime accidents, responsibilities, functions and national law / regulations. VTS
equipment found at Dover, Singapore, Rotterdam and other sea lanes chock points is
highly sophisticated which comes with the issue of having highly trained VTSOs in
order to comprehend and make informed decisions or advice to ships transiting the VTS
area. Furthermore, data collected are used to improve the safety of shipping movements
in any given point. Some VTS centres are tightly regulated to ensure maritime safety2
which is always maintained at any VTS centre around the world as elaborated later
within this chapter.

1

EMSA, Sharing the European Vessel Traffic Image and Beyond. Retrieved on 20.08.2011 from WWW
http://www.emsa.europa.eu/operations/maritime-surveillance/safeseanet/item/217.html?cuscat=113
2
The definition of maritime safety was a thesis subject to ascertain the meaning as perceived by different
players within the VTS domain.
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2.2.3 Types and functions of VTS
IALA 2008 Manual, gives a pictorial overview in Chapter 5 as seen in Figure 1.

Figure 1 - Types and Function of Traffic and Port Services
Source: IALA VTS Manual 2008
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As per the IALA Manual 2008, there are two types of VTS, each one having its own
distinctive parameters and functions. This classification is too theoretical if compared
with the present setting of VTS at some locations around the globe, yet coastal VTS fits
the paradigm of a VTS as seen by IALA, especially where port activities are not present
(TSS at Gulf of Suez and South of the Red Sea, Bab Al Mandeb, Tiran Strait, etc). Thus
a VTS center functions as port or harbour VTS, coastal VTS or both of them
simultaneously like Singapore, Dover, and small single port States. The MarNIS EU
project (EU Commission, 2006) has positively identified the practical use of VTS, in
which they suggested that, a VTS falls within one or more of the following 4 categories:





Harbour and harbour approaches;
Coastal waters and international straits;
Offshore;
Inland waterways.

Local Port Services “LPS” (Harbour and Harbour approaches)
LPS may be a private or public port organisation that only provides information to the
bridge team and does not interact with traffic, thus it is not a VTS that is obliged by law
to have the ability and /or the resources to respond to a developing traffic situation or
be able to monitor shipping movements in the area. However, LPS is designed to
improve port safety and co-ordination of port services by dissemination of operation
information between the terminal / port and the ship. With the advancement of
technology, most LPS or so called ―radio rooms‖ are equipped with AIS display,
received from a third party via the internet. This type of setting is more appropriate for a
small port or in an area where the competent authority did not decide to set up a VTS
area. As experience showed around the world, the LPS can create a problem for the ship
as well as to the VTS centre, especially when two different orders are issued to the
ship‘s master with regard to pilot schedule or other matters. This happens in the absence
of close co-ordination and co-operation between the LPS and VTS within the same area,
which is no fault of the ship‘s master.
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Vessel Traffic Service Categories
VTS with its full elements as stipulated by the IMO guidelines and IALA standards can
improve the safety of traffic and mitigate unacceptable risks, by contributing to safe
navigation of ships in the area, by assisting ships to keep within navigable waters
(IALA, 2008) and by providing them with up to date information regarding weather and
navigational danger. The benefits of a VTS depend on its types which may be divided by
the services provided and the functions performed. The distinction between the different
categories of VTS is fundamental in the choice of service to be provided, its
implementation, maintenance and periodic review as follows:
Information Service (INS); INS is defined by IMO VTS Guidelines as ―a service to
ensure that essential information becomes available in time for on-board navigational
decision-making‖. It comprises broadcasts of information at fixed times or when deemed
necessary by the VTS Authority or at the request of a vessel. The transmission may
include information about ships‘ in the VTS area, waterway conditions, weather,
navigational hazards and other factors that may influence the safe passage of vessels.
Traffic Organisation Service (TOS); TOS is concerned with the forward planning of
ships‘ movements to prevent the development of dangerous situations in any given
location, by providing essential and timely information to assist the bridge team decision
making process. This service is essential in congested port approaches like Jeddah
Islamic Port, Singapore Port, Port Said and others. This service is aided by pre-set
clearances and defined areas on navigational charts. Instructions given as part of a
Traffic Organisation Service Should be result orientated, leaving the details of the
execution to the vessel (ships‘ masters).
The Navigational Assistance Service (NAS); This service may be provided in addition
to INS and TOS. It provides essential and timely navigational information to assists the
navigational decision making process on board. It may also involve navigational advice
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and or instruction. The criticality of this service requires clear operational procedures
from the VTS authority, which should include those who are authorized to provide this
service, thus tightly regulated to eliminate any disastrous effect. The distinction between
navigational information and advice implied two different approaches to the service
provided. Navigational information as being a contributory task and provided either in
response to a specific request from a vessel or when the VTS Authority perceives that
the information would be of use to the vessel. On the other hand, navigational advice
and/or instructions are regarded as participatory, in which

the ―VTS can become

involved in the on-board decision making process by providing navigational advice.
Through the exchange of information between vessel and VTS, an agreed course of
action may emerge‖ (UK MCA, MGN 238). See p. 28 for MV. APL Sydney accident
summary.
VTS Practical Evolution
Today, some major VTS centers are moving away from performing one service only as
stipulated in IMO VTS Guidelines and the IALA Manual 2008. The author experienced
multi tasking VTSO while on watch at a VTS center; VTSOs were performing several
tasks which varied from traffic monitoring, advising, assistance, operational,
commercial, security, managerial, especially in busy port approaches. This fact was also
realized and documented in the 2008 IALA Manual, ―Shore organizations, other than
VTS authorities, at local, national and regional level need to interact with vessels. There
is thus a role to be filled in the context of Vessel Traffic Management (VTM) at a level
higher than the traditional roles of VTS‖. Tasks performed under VTM would involve
having to be able to interact with AIS, SAR, LRIT, VTS, AtoN, Ships‘ Alert System,
Pollution control (OPRC), Port Management Information System (PMIS), Co-operating
with Allied Services3, Port Operations, Emergency Services, Coast Guard, PSC, e-mails

3

IALA VTS manual 2008, page 56 gives full details of the services to be offered.
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and adjacent VTS. This shift of VTS functions has brought about some new challenges
including VTSO training changes, which is regulated by the VTS competent authority.

2.3

Risks and types of maritime accidents at port approaches
The movement of ships through the water between its destinations is full of

risks/hazardous in general and the level of risks fluctuates throughout its voyage. The
risk of grounding and / or collision, thus environmental and property damage is greater
when the ship is approaching ports, coastal navigation, busy shipping lanes or chock
points like Dover, Singapore Strait, Suez Canal and others, compared to being in the
open seas/oceans where ships are left to the mercy of God. Historically, it has been
possible to reduce or mitigate risks at sea, coastal waters and when approaching ports.
This was done by the introduction of preventive measures (IMO Conventions) and
mitigating measures (VTS). Preventive measures are designed to reduce the likelihood
of failures and accidents, thus control the frequency, whereas mitigating measures aim at
reducing the severity of failures and accidents, thus controlling the escalation of failures
and accidents when they have happened.

2.3.1 Hazards / Risks at port approaches
Hazard is an unwanted event or occurrence, a source of potential harm, or a
situation with a potential for causing harm to humans (injury, damage to health),
property (ship, port infrastructures ―tangible‖), the environment, and other things of
value (tourism, state‘s image ―intangible (economic loss)‖) or some combination of
these. (IALA Guidelines 1018). While risk is defined as probability x impact, the term
risk is also commonly used to refer to the unwanted event itself, which is defined
formally as a hazard. Bannister (1997, p. 1) points out that ―risk is not always loss
causing and some risks cause both loss and gain‖ depending on who is on the benefit
side after the damage has been done; for a repairer it means more business, for others it
means losses as highlighted below.
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2.3.2 Risk management process
IALA Risk Management Guidelines 1018, suggest techniques to be used when
managing risk. The process comprises six steps that follow a standardised management
or systems analysis approach: Identify risks/hazards, assess risks, specify risk control
options, make a decision, take action, monitor and review. For the purpose of this
research, only relevant risks / hazards identification items will be looked at in detail.

2.3.2.1

Identification of Risks/Hazards

There are five types of hazards that can generate risks in general;
•

natural hazards such as floods, wind storms, earthquakes, biological hazards, and
other natural phenomena;

•

economic hazards such as inflation, depression, and changes in tax and fee
levies;

•

technical hazards such as system or equipment failure, fire, explosion,
obsolescence, and air/water pollution; and

•

human factors such as errors or omissions by poorly trained persons or fatigued
persons, or acts of wilful negligence, sabotage or terrorism.

•

operational hazards such as groundings, collisions, striking and other unwanted
events. (IALA Guidelines 1018, 2005, p. 11).

Risks are unique to every individual port and area which are required to be assessed in
line with national requirements for the same. Risks are mitigated using different risk
control options (s) in accordance with the local acceptability risk level.
Each risk is associated with some sort of losses, ranging from health, property,
economic, liability, personnel, environmental and finally reputation or status losses.
Thus there is a need to achieve an acceptable balance between the costs of an incident,
and the costs of implementing measures to reduce the hazards / risk of the incident
happening.
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Hazards / risks at port approaches are not limited to the list4 (shown in Appendix A) that
has been identified and acknowledged to have a direct or indirect effect on the outcome
of events and is subjective to individual perception, level of education, resources
distribution priority and line of proficiency.

4

Hazards identified by US CG contained within; 33 C.F.R. PART 161—VESSEL TRAFFIC
MANAGEMENT, Title 33 - Navigation and Navigable Waters http://law.justia.com/cfr/title33/332.0.1.6.29.html & 33 C.F.R. PART 160—PORTS AND WATERWAYS SAFETY—GENERAL, Title 33
- Navigation and Navigable Waters. http://law.justia.com/cfr/title33/33-2.0.1.6.28.html
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2.3.3 Type of maritime accidents at ports approaches
The type of maritime accidents cannot be articulated to a specific type of
accident as they keep evolving with time, grounding being one of the most frequent
accidents; collisions, and allisions are other types that are common to occur at port
approaches and in coastal waters. A study which was conducted in 2006 by the
Department of Logistics5, titled ―Port traffic risks – A study of accidents in Hong Kong
waters‖, showed collision being the first ranked, 54% and contact being the second, 12%
among others as shown in Table 1. Knowing the locality of Hong Kong, the results
shown are apparently true, but not necessary true for other areas like the Baltic Sea.
Table 1 - Average distribution of accident types in Hong Kong waters.

Source: T.L. Yip / Transportation Research Part E 44 (2008) 921–931.
5

A study done in 2006 which is carried out by The Hong Kong Polytechnic University, Hung Hom,
Kowloon, Hong Kong.
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Data related to accidents at port approaches and coastal waters involving VTS centres
were requested, and raw data were received for from 2005 to 2010 (see Appendix B)
from Marine Accident Investigation Branch6 (MAIB), the UK. They were filtered more
to relate it to the research; the compiled results are as shown in Figure 2.

Figure 2 – Number of accidents at VTS within UK waters between 2005 to 2011
Source; Compiled by the Author from MAIB raw data, 2011.

The compiled data showed interesting trends. The number of accidents at port
approaches is decreasing (may be due to the strict port authorities regulations in VTS
areas) while it is on the rise at coastal waters. This is a phenomenon that needs to be
researched in detail to ascertain the causal findings made by the simple MIAB data
compilation.

6

Data was requested from MAIB via e-mail regarding accidents at VTS area, raw data was given.
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Table 2 shows MAIB accidents records either on board UK vessels or at UK territorial
waters while ―entering or leaving port‖ or ―on Passage‖ 2005 – 2010.
Table 2 – VTS area accidents records in the UK

Source: MAIB data information center UK, 2011.

In summary, hazards / risks at port approaches and coastal waters are high which was
confirmed by the examination of worldwide historical data on shipping accidents that
identified collisions, groundings and contacts as being the most common maritime
accidents taken place at port approaches and coastal waters, with varying consequences
(losses), ranging from

damage to health, property, economic, liability, personnel,

environmental and finally reputation or status losses. Risks control options have been
employed on board ships as well as around the world; they include the use of VTS,
deployment and optimization of AtoN, and a better regulatory frame work on board and
ashore.
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2.4

Layers and elements of VTS regulations
The compelling need to harmonize maritime laws and regulations has been

highlighted by Professor Mukherjee of World Maritime University (WMU) in his book
(Maritime Legislation) ―The inherent international character of shipping and the
inconvenience and hardship generated by conflicts in practical and legal affairs make it
necessary for maritime law to attain a degree of international uniformity‖ (Mukherjee,
2002, p. 113). The same is true with harmonizing maritime safety regulations which was
reflected in the preamble of the IMO VTS Guidelines, ―RECOGNIZING ALSO that the
use of differing vessel traffic service procedures may cause confusion to masters of
vessels moving from one vessel traffic service area to another‖ (IMO resolution
A.857(20)).
The inception of VTS (as one of several risk control measures to promote maritime
safety) around the world sprung out of States‘ obligations as setup in the UNCLOS 82.
The following literature will shed light on the relationship between the United Nation
Convention on The Law Of The Sea 1982 (UNCLOS) and the VTS, IMO obligations as
setup in UNCLOS, IMO conventions and the VTS, IMO Guidelines for VTS, IALA
contribution to the VTS, VTS National Legislation (see Figure 3).

VTS

Others

IALA

VTS Manual 2008 &
other publications

IMO Resolution A.857(20)

SOLAS & STCW

IMO

UNCLOS

Safer port approach
for ships in VTS area

Government Maritime Safety Obligations
Figure 3 – International Conventions and Instruments used to regulate VTS
Source: Author 2011
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2.4.1 The International Framework
The international VTS framework is about those conventions that are regarded as
public instruments, which set out the various requirements and expectations as follows:

2.4.1.1

UNCLOS and the VTS

UNCLOS 1982, brought about the results of several years of negotiations
between States in coordination with the maritime community around the world. States
have also came together at different UN forum to:
develop a coherent, consistent, and efficient approach to VTSs sourced in
international law and internationally agreed upon guidance documents. Any
examination of the international framework for vessel traffic management must
begin with the 1982 U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The
Convention is widely viewed as a constitutive instrument which provides a basic
legal framework that was designed to be complemented by additional
international agreements, most of which are developed through the IMO (Allen,
2009, pp. 10-11).
Article 24 (2), of the Convention imposes a limited duty on coastal states to provide
information services to vessels in their territorial sea. However, the Convention limits the
applicability of coastal state vessel traffic management measures in the state‗s territorial sea
or exclusive economic zone, e.g. jurisdiction over foreign vessels in innocent passage
through the state‗s territorial sea or in transit passage through an international strait. Article

21 of UNCLOS, permits a coastal state to adopt laws and regulations relating to foreign
vessels on innocent passage through the territorial sea where, inter alia, such laws
respect the safety of navigation and the regulation of maritime traffic. The convention
requires the States to adopt measures through the ―competent international organization‖
(IMO), that may minimize the threat of accidents which might cause environmental
pollution, UNCLOS Part VII.
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2.4.1.2

IMO Conventions and the VTS

IMO has been given the mandate to further regulate the provisions of maritime
safety and marine environment protection as stipulated in its generality within
UNCLOS. The two main IMO conventions governing the VTS issues are the
International Convention on the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) and the Convention on
Standards of Training, Certification and Watch-keeping of Seafarers (STCW), in which
they regulate VTS establishment, organisation, conduct of VTS operations, and the
training and certification of VTS personnel as well as those on board ships.
SOLAS 74
IMO Maritime Safety Committee (MSC), adopted a new regulation (12) in June 1997
which establishes conditions for implanting VTS. This was revised in 2000 and entered
into force in July 2002. (IALA VTS Manual 2008). SOLAS Chapter V which addresses
operational safety of navigation acknowledged that ―marine risk management efforts must
extend beyond vessel CDEM7 measures‖ (Allen, 2009, p.13).

Within SOLAS Chapter V, Regulation 12 ―Vessel Traffic Services‖8, the regulation
makes reference to the IMO adopted assembly resolution A.857(20) of 1997 regarding
Guidelines for VTS, which is not mandatory to member States. The IMO VTS
Guidelines are designed to be implemented in conjunction with other IMO Criteria for
Ship Reporting Systems, resolution MSC.43(64) as amended and the IALA VTS
Manual.

7

Construction, Design, Equipment, and Manning (CDEM), acronym used in Allen, 2009, Article. .
Full text of the regulation can be found in IMO SOLAS Convention, consolidated edition 2009 on page
251.
8
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STCW 78 as amended, Convention and Code
The Convention establishes international standards for mariners competencies,
qualifications and training. The STCW Convention imposes obligations on the
shipowner or operator, the ship‗s master, and watch officers. ―STCW prescribes internal
risk management measures that must be considered in any examination of existing or
proposed external risk management measures, such as VTS‖ (Allen, 2009, p.16). Since its
adoption in 1978, the Convention has undergone two major revisions in 1995 and most
recent in 20109. The recent amendments require deck officers to learn t he use of ship

reporting (including VTS procedures) to maintain a safe navigational watch10. The use
of the Standard Marine Communication Phrases (SMCP) is also a part of ship‘s officer
curriculum which is the same for VTSO. In addition, requirements for voyage planning
are incorporated into both the SOLAS and STCW Conventions.

9

STCW, Manila Amendments, June 2010.
STCW Code- Table A-II/1. Full text can be found at page 101 of the STCW Convention which include
Manila amendments , 2011.
10
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2.4.1.3

IMO Guidelines for VTS (Resolution A.857(20) 1997

Since IMO recognition of the VTS value in 1968, several resolutions have been
issued as listed below;




Resolution A.158 (ES.IV) Recommendation on Port Advisory Systems, adopted
1968.
Resolution A.578 (14) Guidelines for Vessel Traffic Services, adopted 1985.
Assembly resolution A.857(20) Revised Guidelines for Vessel Traffic Service,
adopted in November 1997.

SOLAS Chapter V Regulation 12/3, requires contracting States where possible to follow
the Guidelines for Vessel Traffic Services developed by the Organization and issued via
IMO Resolution A.857(20) adopted by the IMO on 27 November 1997. The guidelines
contain two annexes covering a spectrum of issues that are relevant to establishment,
regulating as well as the operational issues (running) of the VTS as explained below.
Annex I, contains general definitions, administrative and legal elements that a
contracting government should consider when setting up a VTS. There are at least two
major definitions which are of importance in regulating any VTS.
―Competent authority; is the authority made responsible, in whole or in part, by the
government for safety, including environmental safety, and efficiency of vessel traffic
and the protection of the environment‖. Its role is vital during the planning and
establishing of the VTS, in which it should ensure, inter alia, the presence of a legal basis

for the operation of a VTS and is operated in accordance with national and international
law, that a VTS authority is appointed and legally empowered, objectives for the VTS are
set, service area is delineated and declared as VTS area, the VTS centre is properly manned
by qualified and trained staff and the VTS is operated in accordance with relevant IMO
resolutions. Furthermore, the VTS authority should establish appropriate qualifications and
training requirements for VTS operators, determine the type and level of services to be
provided, establish appropriate standards for shore and offshore based equipment, finally
establish a policy with respect to violations of VTS regulatory requirements.
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―VTS authority - the authority with responsibility for the management, operation and
coordination of the VTS, interaction with participating vessels and the safe and effective
provision of the service‖. In summary, the VTS is the executive arm of the competent
authority and is required to ensure that objectives of the VTS are met, ensure that the
VTS operations are harmonized with ship reporting and routeing measures, aids to
navigation, pilotage and port operations.
In addition, it should adhere to the set standards, requirements and level of services of a
VTS, make sure that operating procedures for routine and emergency situations are
established, information regarding the availability of VTS is published in the appropriate
nautical publications and in the ―World VTS Guide‖.
Finally, it should consider the legal implications of shipping accidents where the VTSO
may have failed to carry out their duty competently.
Other items of concern to this research are as follows:
Operating procedures, which require distinction between internal and external
procedures, where ―Internal procedures cover operating instruments, interactions among
the staff and the internal routing and distribution of data. External procedures cover
interactions with users and allied services‖ (IMO Resolution A.857(20))
Guidance for planning a vessel traffic service includes a list of hazardous items that
necessitate the use of a VTS, which include, inter alia areas of

high traffic density,

ships carrying hazardous cargo, conflicting and complex navigation patterns, difficult
hydrographical, hydrological and meteorological elements, shifting shoals and other
local hazards, environmental considerations, narrow channels and port configuration.
Annex II, provides a framework that elaborates specifically on how and what standards
the VTS authority can use to fulfil its obligation with regard to human elements that
operate the VTS centre as stipulated in the same guidelines (Annex I, 2.2.8). The
guidance is complemented by various IALA recommendations regarding training of
VTS personnel (as shown in Appendix C).
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2.4.1.4

IALA contribution to the VTS

The International Association of Marine Aids to Navigation and Lighthouse
Authorities (IALA) is a non-profit making international technical association,
established in 1957. It has approximately 75 national members and 30 affiliated
organizations. IALA is a Non-Governmental Organisation (NGO) and has a permanent
chair at the IMO meetings and it brings together services and organizations concerned
with the provision or maintenance of marine aids to navigation systems and allied
activities at sea and on some inland waterways, which are navigable by ocean-going
vessels. In this context, VTS is considered to be an aid to navigation. The IALA
consultative body for VTS matters constitute highly professional bodies like:
International Maritime Pilots‘ Association (IMPA),
International Harbour Masters Association (IHMA)
International Federation of Shipmasters‘ Associations (IFSMA)
International Association of Ports and Harbours (IAPH) and
The Nautical Institute
IALA has been involved in the drafting of all IMO guidelines concerning VTS since
1985. It was decided that Resolution A.857(20) remains unchanged and IALA will
publish up-to-date information as required and where appropriate in the VTS Manual
(IALA VTS manual, 2008, p. 45). In 2000, IMO recognized the development of the
IALA recommendations and other documents and invited its member States to bring
those recommendations to the attention of their VTS authorities. Subsequently, the
IALA standards are now generally recognized as the primary training and certification
standards for VTS personnel. The IALA VTS Manual 2008, chapter 8, suggests that in
planning a VTS, the powers and authority delegated to individual VTS operators will
need to be established by the VTS Authority; it highlights the need for VTS personnel to
be aware of the legal basis under which they are operating and from which they derive
the authority to interact with traffic. It also highlights issues that need to be legally
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addressed regarding lines of responsibilities as well as actions to be taken against
infringement of VTS regulations, power of enforcement and most importantly VTS and
operator liability (See appendix C).

2.4.2 National Legislation for VTS
Contracting governments party to UNCLOS, SOLAS and STCW are obliged to
enact appropriate national legislation to give effect to the provisions that have been
agreed. Such enactments will, where appropriate, include provisions for enforcement
and sanctions for infringements. Governments may chose the appropriate way to
incorporate the same into the national legislation. For practical reasons, most
governments have relied on two main bodies of primary legislation: Merchant Shipping
Laws or Acts and Harbour or Port, or Docks Laws or Acts. SOLAS and other IMO
Convections involve items that also extend to the maritime public which is ―effectuated
through national regulatory legislation incorporating the relevant international regulatory
convention‖ (Mukherjee, 2002, p. 55). In his book, he suggested a scheme of maritime
legislation which incorporated a chapter on ―Ports Administration and Pilotage‖; the
regulatory framework for a VTS was not addressed explicitly to emphasise its specialty
in mitigating maritime accidents, but SOLAS gave the right to the State to make VTS
mandatory as appropriate, thus to avoid a legal vacuum, the author‘s view is to of
incorporate it within the Port Act.
Generally, harbour acts would be of a national character with uniformity in the
application of laws to all port undertakings, so it would be followed by local legislation
which is area specific. Other by-law requirements have not been a requirement (or not
seen to exist) in some States. Its absence shows its importance in which it is also
regulated at national level in some countries (e.g. USA).
There is no one ideal VTS national legislation as seen from the literature; however, most
States who have VTS regulations are meeting the IMO VTS Guidelines and IALA
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recommendations. Yet there are some who are exceeding the IMO Guidelines while
others are having their own regulations which do not conform with international
standard and expectations. This is reflected in the IMO Guidelines for VTS
―RECOGNIZING ALSO that the use of differing vessel traffic service procedures may
cause confusion to masters of vessels moving from one vessel traffic service area to
another‖; this is further highlighted in the use of US VTS terminology in which
―direction‖ (using U.S. terminology) means ―instruction‖ as per the IMO SMCP
terminology11.
State legislations are expected to conform with the minimum requirements as set in the
IMO Guidelines for VTS and IALA recommendations. The name of the act will vary
around the world depending on the need to explicitly have a separate act like in the
Netherlands ―National Shipping Traffic Act of 1988‖; in the US it is ―Port and
Waterway Safety Act (PWSA) of 1972, as amended‖. The degree of information has
been broken down into 4 main elements, namely Primary Legislation, Secondary
Legislation/Statuary Instruments, Guidance at national level and finally Byelaws (see
Appendix D). The World Bank Port Reform Toolkit augments in the ―Port-tool-kit‖12
document, the need for the competent authority to regulate the VTS, if it is to be
included in the concession agreement.
IALA Guidelines No. 1055 on preparing for a Voluntary IMO Audit on Vessel Traffic
Services Delivery, gives guidance to its members on those sections of the pre-audit
questionnaire that the administrations in charge of Vessel Traffic Services (VTS) have to
answer according to their obligations in SOLAS regulations V/12.

11

IMO, Resolution A.918(22) Standard Marine Communication Phrases (SMCP).
See World Bank Port Reform Toolkit for elements. Retrieved on Aug 15 2011 from;
http://www.ppiaf.org/ppiaf/sites/ppiaf.org/files/documents/toolkits/Portoolkit/Toolkit/m
odule3/marine_services.html
12
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2.5

The VTS contribution in maritime accidents as seen in the court
In some circumstances, there will be some claim cases which are referred to the

court following accidents. Regulating VTS area may have reduced the number of
accidents in the VTS area, yet accidents still take place because of many reasons. Two
accidents involving VTS are overviewed below.

2.5.1 The Port of Melbourne v M.V. APL Sydney ship’s owner
On 13th December 2008, the APL Sydney dragged its anchor across a submarine gas
pipeline in Port Phillip Bay (Melbourne – Australia) within the VTS area, allegedly
causing extremely large losses to the Ethanol pipe line13. Following the accident, an
independent

investigation was carried out by Australian Transport Safety Bureau

(ATSB); the investigation14 identified safety issues in relation to:


The port‘s risk management with respect to the pipeline and anchorage
boundaries and its shipping control procedures; the ship‘s safety management
system; the pilotage company‘s safety management system.



APL Sydney‘s safety management system did not adequately ensure that the
master was certain about his overriding authority and responsibility with respect
to decisions and actions aimed at ensuring the safety of the ship. [Significant
safety issue]. p. 62.



The Port of Melbourne Corporation‘s shipping control safe operating procedures,
the port operations handbook and shipping control staff training did not provide
the control officer with adequate guidance and information to allow him to safely
manage the events of 13 December 2008 and give appropriate instructions,
advice and information to the APL Sydney‘s master and pilot. [Significant safety
issue]. p. 62.

13

Maritime Accident Casebook, 2010. APL Sydney Gas Pipeline Rupture – Comms The Snag. Retrieved
on 15.08.2011 from http://maritimeaccident.org/2010/04/apl-sydney-gas-pipeline-rupture-comms-the-snag/
14
ATSB, Marine Occurrence Investigation No. 260, MO-2008—012. APL Sydney Accident report.
Retrieved on 14.08.2011 from http://www.atsb.gov.au/media/1373626/mo2008012.pdf
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In view of the findings, ATSB issued ―Safety Action‖ to be undertaken by the all parties,
including the VTS authority. In addition to revising the anchorage area, a new
requirement for masters and pilots to report their intended anchorage position to VTS,
this is to enable improved traffic monitoring and control by VTS officers via the VTS
electronic displays. Other measures taken include requirement to switch to
comprehensive dynamic risk assessment if wind exceed 30 knots in inner port, new
procedures to confirm strong wind warnings are received on board anchored ships, risk
control measures to be considered by the VTS authority which ―include a review of VTS
operator training for monitoring anchored ships so that an early warning can be given to
any ship that do not maintain position. The introduction of standard procedures for
anchoring ships in heavy weather is also to be considered and agreed with PPSP15‖.
(ATSB, 2008, p. 52).
The same accident claim16 was brought before the court, in which among other
interesting aspects of the decision made by judge Rares relating to the roles of the Port
Authority. He said "It is disturbing that the port authority, through harbour control‖
objected on the pilot‘s suggestion, apparently had no emergency plans for the
contingency that was unfolding; the harbour control radio operators should have been
trained to meet such a contingency including the danger associated with the use of any
source of fire with fouled gas pipe lines. This reflected the role of VTS in mitigating
maritime risk through regulating the VTS actions which include, holistic risk assessment
accordingly.

15

Port Phillip Sea Pilots (PPSP)
Casenote, 2010. Strong Wise Limited v Esso Australia Resources Pty Ltd [2010] FCA 240. Retrieved
14.08.2011 from http://www.cbp.com.au/getattachment/3948a5c3-a25a-4ca7-88943bc8ee5510e1/Strong-Wise-Limited-v-Esso-Australia-Resources-Pty
16
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2.5.2 Collision at National Port Authority (NPA) VTS area - South Africa.
Two ships collided at the approach to Cape Town in the vicinity of the TSS
which is the same as the VTS area. The visibility was less than one nautical mile and
one ship was steaming in the wrong lane after departing the port; in the mean time the
VTSO did nothing to alert the two ships. The two ship-owners plus others after settling
their differences
agreed to pool their claims against the Port Authority and to institute action
against the Port Authority for their damages arising from the collision. In
essence, the basis of their claim was that the Port Authority was liable for the
damages sustained by them due to the negligence of the VTSO, who failed to
provide any information, recommendations, warnings or directions to either of
the vessels prior to the collision, as a result of which the collision occurred. At
the trial it was admitted that the crew of both vessels were causally negligent, but
it was argued that the Port Authority was also partially to blame and thus should
bear some of the loss. Midway through the trial the matter settled. The principal
claim against the Port Authority by the owners of the two vessels and the cargo
interests was in delict4 (i.e., tort, in English terminology). In most claims against
a VTS Authority the plaintiff will inevitably base the action in tort, although it is
conceivable that in certain circumstances a contractual claim may arise17
(MacWilliam and Cooke, 2006, p. 366).
The South African courts have made it very clear to any public authorities including
NPA, that it hold public authorities liable for their negligence in appropriate cases
including the act of the VTSO. Furthermore, it is highlighted that if the loss of a VTS
customer is due to the negligence of VTS authority, it should be held liable accordingly.

17

MacWilliam, R. and Cooke, D. [2006] L.M.C.L.Q 362. VTS: Lifting the fog of legal liability. Retrieved
Aug 10th 2011from WWW: http://www.i-law.com/ilaw/doc/view.htm?id=130505
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2.6

Summary.
VTS is a term adopted at the IMO to describe a range of systems put together

and used by port and coastal States to enhance maritime safety, protection of the marine
environment and lately security. Type and function is decided by the competent
authority of the State, depending on the outcome of the risk assessment undertaken to
determine the risk control measures (options) required to mitigate the risk identified at
the coastal or port approaches.
VTS is regulated at different levels, where it is States‘ obligation as per UNCLOS and
further amplified by IMO through SOLAS and VTS Guidelines in conjunction with
IALA VTS regulating instruments.
IMO encourage its member States to follow its guidelines to ensure global VTS
procedures harmonization. A State may have further requirements that conform with its
national laws and regulations. The liability of a VTS authority for an accidents inside the
VTS declared area will depend on the States‘ national liability laws and may vary
around the world.
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CHAPTER
3.1

3

METHODOLOGY

Introduction.
This chapter describes the research design and method which will be utilised to

complete this research. The layout of the chapter is as illustrated in Figure 4. The chapter
starts with a full description of the qualitative research design which will be used in the
context of this study. The later part of the chapter describes the selection of the
population, sources of data collection, and the used techniques for data analysis.

Methodology

Qualitative

Issues to

Research

Consider

Selection of
Participants

Sources of Data
Collection

Data Analysis

Figure 4 - Summary of research methodology
Source: Author. 2011
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3.2

Research design
The research aims to understand and explore the current regulations and

information regarding VTS including benchmarks, to better mitigate maritime accidents
at port approaches in quest of maritime safety. Thus the research will be based on the
qualitative research methodology. According to (Zikmund, 2000) the focus of qualitative
research is not on numbers but on words and observations, stories, visual portrayals,
meaningful characterisation, interpretations, and other expressive descriptions.
The study can be characterised as explanatory research. (Saunders, M., Lewis, P. and
Thornhill, A. , 2000), and other writers define explanatory studies as those which try to
establish casual relationship between variables (regulating VTS to mitigate maritime
risks). The study emphasis is on the use of regulations as a risk control measure .

3.3

Research Methods
Given the nature of the research which is explanatory, a qualitative research

design will be used and is well suited to answer the research questions. It involves
collecting data by observing, asking questions, dialogues with individuals and
examining documents and case studies. It also ranges from being highly structured to
very unstructured at the point of data collection. Qualitative research will give the depth
of information required to study the case, and will provide an insight into the use of
regulations to mitigate maritime accidents at port approaches. Qualitative data analysis
can be helpful to focus on the process and on the overall understanding of the
respondent. A short questionnaire was used to explore the current setting / understanding
and perceptions of VTS centres. While semi structured interviews, observations and self
experience (as a VTS operator as well as regulator) were used to complement the results
derived from the questionnaires and the secondary data collected.
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3.4

Selection of participants
The participants were selected on the basis of having up-to date VTS centre(s)

and complemented with apparently robust regulatory system, others were chosen
because it was easy to access to them via e-mail (see Table 3 for details). However,
other participants were chosen because of their links to the business of VTS or having a
major port in developing countries. The participants also involved ships‘ masters and
maritime casualty investigation authorities. The fact that the interviews and
questionnaires were done during the month of July, which is the summer holiday for
most regions did not affect the outcome of participation either in numbers or in quality.

Table 3 - List of Participants
No.

Establishment

Remarks

1

MAIB

2

UKHO

Records of VTS related accidents at
port approaches in the UK.
Publication of VTS on ALRS.

3

Gdynia VTS

Field visit to Gdansk VTS

4

Malmo VTS

Interview with VTS manager.

5

Respond to questionnaire

6

Maritime Administration in
developing maritime States
Ships‘ Master and officers

7

Institutions

Research documents on VTS

others

Interview with VTS expert.

Respond to questionnaire

Source: Author, 2011
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3.5

Sources of data collections.
One of the most important aims of this research was to collect available

regulatory data from developed and developing nations related to VTS regulations.
Furthermore, the author intended to find and analyze information contained within
international agencies/bodies like IMO, IALA, IAPH, IMPA and VTS makers. The
information was used to develop a comprehensive understanding of VTS regulations
around the world and IMO requirements. Yet this research is constrained by the
available time frame to finish it. Some prospective VTS respondents are far away from
the study area; therefore, e-mail was deemed to be the quickest and most economical
method to disseminate questionnaires. World Maritime University field study trips were
also utilized to establish contacts and do casual interviews with VTS centres where
visited.
During data collection, four methods were used to collect data: literature study, court
case proceedings, questionnaires, interviews and observations. Primary data were
collected from maritime law text books, scholarly articles, case digests, specialized text
books, conventions and guidelines and States‘ maritime law, while secondary
information was obtained from related journals, industry periodicals unpublished
materials, dissertations, case summaries, seminar papers, field study interviews.
The internet was used extensively to search and view both secondary and primary
information as the e-era has moved information closer and faster than before. Moreover,
the use of computers today allows information to be stored and analysis can be done in
different format and methods.
By doing this, theoretical information was obtained which reflected the current
regulations and perception of the industry and the IMO member States, which enabled
the researcher to narrow the regulations gap for a better understanding of mitigating
maritime accidents at port approaches.
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VTS centres, court cases involving VTS issues and casualty investigation bodies were
the main source of data collected. Again this gave the research the reliability and validity
it seeks to maintain. However, the data are more "raw" and are seldom pre-categorized;
consequently, there was a need to re-organize all of that raw details.
In order to collect the data from some of the above sources, in-depth semi-structured
short interviews were carried out, which was the most appropriate method because of the
time available. People tend to pay little if no attention towards other means of data
collection (subjective to world region, and national settings), and because the research is
an academic requirement more than an organisation request/project (like the EU projects
―MarNIS, Baltic Sea-master I and II, etc‖). The questionnaires stand a little chance of
respond on time unless they are based on influences or network in which the feedback
can be biased. However, a questionnaire was used to have the opinion and understanding
/ expectations of the respondents to the research questions.
Carrying out the interviews and disseminating questionnaires with the full relevant
population helped in developing a wider network around the world. Finally, interviews
will allow flexibility with the participants; however, an un-structured interview is better
because it allows the interviewee to express all his perceptions with no leads what so
ever. But interviews take much time, are hard to analyse and compare unless they are
structured. Further, they can be costly (especially when using telephone and having to
travel). For the purpose of analysis and record keeping, interviews have been recorded
for later use and safe keeping for those participants who agreed to be recorded.
Other methods of data collection were the use of internet on a selective basis from
different parts of the world which aided the analysis process when confirming validity
and looking at VTS regulations around the world. Some ports and VTS centres have
their data on line as required by their national law and to create a competitive and
transparency edge they seek in marketing the port.
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The data collection was done in three phases using different data collection instruments
in each phase as explained in Figure 5.

Phase One

Vetting of
Primary &
Secondary Data

Phase Two

Phase Three

Questionnaire
Design and
Testing

Field Work
(Interviews &
Observations)

Raw Research Data
Collected

Figure 5 - Phases of Data Collection
Source; Author, 2011

Phase One
Screening of Primary & Secondary Data (documented data)
Reviewing such data before carrying out the interviews gave the researcher a provisional
direction which is built on the current industry norms and standards among developed
nations. It helped in preparing for general direction of the interview (see Appendix H) to
obtain up-to date information and not ask for information which is already documented;
subsequently, this reduced the interview time and made it more constructive. However,
in the absence of proper data mining coupled with the need to exactly know what is been
looked for and the quest to learn more about VTS operations around the world, all of this
was time consuming and frustrating at times.
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Phase Two
Questionnaire Design and Testing
Questionnaires were prepared for the participants (shipboard officers & VTS centres,
competent authorities); the same was tested in comparison to other literature
questionnaires (IALA Guideline No. 1055 on preparing for a Voluntary IMO Audit on
VTS delivery) and feedback from mariners before being e-mailed to the VTS
community (see appendices E and F). The questionnaires were introduced via the same
e-mail sent to participants explaining the purpose of the study and its benefits (see
appendix G). For expeditious responses, the researcher had to send a reminder e-mail
before the suggested dead line. However, this proved to be more difficult than
anticipated, as the feedback took longer than usual. In some instances it was decided to
drop the responses at a set date in order to complete the analysis on time.

Phase Three
Actual Interviews and Observations.
This phase involved face to face interviews using semi-structured interview style, in
which a set of relevant questions were prepared beforehand in order to reduce the
interview time, (see Appendix H). A tape recorder was used to record the interviews for
later usage during the analysis process. Each interview lasted about 30 to 60 minutes and
was only recorded with the consent of the interviewees. The transcripts were later edited
for accuracy and summarized for better data presentation.
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3.6

Data Analysis
Saunders, et al, (2000), point out that because of the features of the qualitative

data, there is no standardised approach to the analysis of the data. In order to analyse the
data collected, Miles and Huberman's (1994) interaction model was used to analyse the
data. It involves data reduction, data display and drawing valid conclusions.
Data Reduction
The mass of data has to be organized and somehow meaningfully reduced or
reconfigured. Miles and Huberman (1994) define it as "The process of selecting,
focusing, simplifying, abstracting, and transforming the data that appear in written up
field notes or transcriptions." Not only do the data need to be condensed for the sake of
manageability, they also have to be transformed, so they can be made intelligible in
terms of the issues being addressed. Data reduction often forces choices about which
aspects of the assembled data should be emphasized, minimized, or set aside completely
for the purposes of the project at hand.
Data Display
This is the second element or stage in Miles and Huberman's (1994) model of qualitative
data analysis. It provides "an organized, compressed assembly of information that
permits conclusion drawing...". Data displays, whether in word or diagrammatic form,
allow the analyst to extrapolate from the data enough to begin to separate systematic
patterns and inter-relationships. At the display stage, additional, higher order categories
or themes may emerge from the data that go beyond those first discovered during the
initial process of data reduction.
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Conclusion Drawing and Verification
Conclusion drawing involves stepping back to consider what the analyzed data mean
and to assess their implications for the questions at hand. "The meanings emerging from
the data have to be tested for their plausibility, their sturdiness, their ―conformability‖ that is, their validity" (Miles and Huberman, 1994). However, qualitative data may be
analysed using other alternative approaches (e.g. narratives and meaning, software) but
for the time being, the focus is on the above with the triangulation method in mind. The
data were divided during the analysis into three categories, mainly VTS
authority/centres perception, ship‘s master expectations and court case rulings. The
population for this research comprised selected regulators, VTS centres around the
world and VTS user (ships‘ Masters) from different shipping companies.

3.7

Summary
Qualitative research methodology was used because of the explanatory and

inductive nature of the study. Data were collected from primary sources involving the
use of court case, literature review, World Maritime University (WMU) field study trips,
questionnaires which were designed to be general in order to ensure confidentiality of
participants. Further, face to face semi structured interviews were carried out to allow
the participants space in order to express themselves freely. Other sources of data
gathering involved the examination of secondary data obtained from either internet or
VTS related web sites, peer reviewed journals, conference/ seminar proceedings, research
reports, periodicals and lectures handouts. Careful data filtering was made to the selected
data for their relevance to the topic. Finally, data analysis depended on interpretation for

categorization and data display to draw conclusions on regulating VTS to mitigate
maritime accidents at port approaches.
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CHAPTER
4.1

4

RESULTS OF THE QUESTIONNAIRE

Introduction
This chapter presents the results of the questionnaires and the information found

within the collected from the literature, survey questionnaires, , vetted secondary data,
and seminars conducted at World Maritime University during the study period especially
―Maritime Law and Policy, VTS & pilotage‖ and also from the researcher‘s experience
and observations while working in the same field. Changing hats between a ―VTS
operator, users (master and pilot)‖ and now regulator helped the researcher to understand
the perspective of the actors involved in the VTS shipping domain. International actors,
mainly the IMO, IALA, MCA, USCG, MAIB, UK HO and EMSA literature study were
conducted. Various guidelines and recommendations concerning VTS regulating issues
were studied, using static information displayed on the actors‘ homepages or responses
via e-mail. Documents pertaining to VTS regulations, accidents‘ records at port
approaches and court cases involving VTS were also studied. The study was organized
to explain how a VTS avail maritime authority can be regulated in controlling the
number of accidents at port approaches.
Participants overview
Invitations were sent to shipping companies to disseminate the questionnaires to
shipboard officers, and a total of twenty two (22) questionnaires were received from
seafarers comprising masters, chief, second and third officers serving on different types
of ships. They represent a simple random sample (Weiss, 2008, p.12) (see Appendix I).
Fourteen (14) VTS centres / competent authorities also participated from five regions as
shown in Appendix J. Finally, four (4) interviews were conducted mainly in the EU
region. Furthermore, other sources of data gathering mechanisms were used to answer
the three research questions.
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4.2

Study findings
This section reports the major findings of the study with particular attention to

the data as collected from the questionnaires that addresses the research questions. It is
divided into three sub-section as follows:
Research Questions:
1. What are the risks that need to be mitigated in areas of port approaches?
2. How can VTS (operators) be involved in accident development and what
is their liability?
3. Are there KPI or benchmarks for VTS to be regarded as good for
mitigating maritime accidents?
In analysing the data collected, the study used Miles and Huberman's (1994) interaction
model in order to explore the participants‘ insight regarding the research questions,
mainly risks at port approaches, accountability of VTSO as regulated and benchmarks of
VTS centres. It involves data reduction, data display and drawing valid conclusions.
Data were coded, summarized and clustered into categories using a matrix approach for
each research question. Microsoft Excel sheets were used as alternative forms of data
display. The next paragraphs shows the results of the research survey questionnaires.
Figure 6 and 7 illustrate the distribution of the research population.

Figure 7 - Research participants.

Figure 6 - VTS distribution.

Source; Author, 2011

Source; Author, 2011
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4.2.1 Research Question 1
What are the risks that need to be mitigated in areas of port approaches?
Identifying elements of risk in its general term that may be used around the world
proved to be a more difficult task than anticipated; however, there are certain elements
that are inherited within any given industry. The concept of listing risks to be mitigated
at port approaches was focused on the practical experiences of ships‘ officers as well as
VTSO and port approach accident reviews.
In investigating what are the risks at port approaches, and feedback to questionnaires
were sorted out for an in-depth analysis. Drawing on the data sorted and analyzed, four
main additional hazards factors were identified namely: ship‘s staff area experience,
VTSO ship‘s awareness and expectations, local shipping traffic density and finally busy
VHF working channels.
Table 4 shows the number of respondents in agreement with the suggested risks
associated with port approaches.
Table 4 - Additional risk factors to consider at VTS area.
Item
R.
Total Population
Qstn
Ranks on board
Local Shipping traffic density
Master / officer area experience
Busy VHF Communication channel
Q 1 VTSO ship's awareness /expectations
VTSO English ability
Ship's staff VTS awareness
/expectation
Lack of VTS area Info.
Source: Author, 2011
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No. of participants

Sum

12
5
2
3
Master Chief Second Third
10
5
1
3
10
4
2
3
9
4
0
3

22
19
19
16

9

3

1

3

16

8

3

1

1

13

6

3

1

3

13

5

3

0

1

9

So what sort of facts did the risk questionnaires elicit?
The participants (22 ships‘ officers), collectively gave different weight to each suggested
factor to be considered when addressing the risk identification at port approaches. These
are in addition to those risks that are location dependent. Figure 8 shows the number of
participants who said yes to the proposed factors.
 Local traffic density at port approaches was seen by the majority 19 – (86%) of the
respondents to be a hazard when making port to pick up pilot, transit or anchor.
 Master and bridge team area experience is also regarded as one of the top hazard
factor to consider by 19 – (86%) participants.

Figure 8 - Additional risk factor to consider at port approaches.
Source: Author, 2011.

 The absence of VTSO sea experience was seen by 16 – (73%) participants to be a
hazard that may lead to an accident. The same number of participants regard busy
VTS/ports VHF channels to be a risk at port approaches, which may result in the loss
of vital information.
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 VTSO English language ability and ships‘ staff VTS awareness was also regarded to
be of an issue to consider when identifying hazard factors at port approaches.
However, only 13 – 59% agreed with this.
 The use of VTS communication markers and lack of VTS information were not
regarded to be important by ships‘ staff, only 9 – (41%) out of 22 said yes to these as
seen in Figure 9.
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4.2.2 Research Question 2
How can VTS (operators) be involved in accident development and what is their
liability?
The data in Table 5 are based on anonymous responses to questionnaire sent out to
seafarers (22) and VTS centres or competent authorities. Data was filtered and
categorized for displaying as per Table 5.
Table 5 - Accidents development factors and accountability at VTS area.
Research
Qstn

Q2

No. of Participants

Item

Sum

12

5

2

3

Master

Chief

Second

Third

Vessel tracking /monitoring and warning

12

4

2

3

21

Number of incidents and near misses

11

4

1

3

19

Risk analysis for VTS area

9

3

1

2

15

Availability of standard operation procedures

10

4

1

2

17

Use of VTS communication marker

6

2

1

0

9

VTSO accountability Inside VTS area

9

3

2

2

16

VTSO accountability Outside VTS area

3

0

0

0

3

Total Population
Ranks on board

22

Source; Author, 2011

Results of the questionnaire brought about differing findings to the questions as follows:
 VTS main functions, regulations and procedures: The majority of the responses
have a common agreement that failure by VTS to track, monitor and warn vessels
inside a VTS area is a major factor in accidents that can be avoided by VTSO action.
Also for the VTS authority failure to exercise due diligence in having the standard
operation procedures as per the results showed 17- (77%).
 Use of VTS communication pre-fix (markers): The use of communication markers
was not consider to be a problem for the majority of the respondents; however, 9(40%) regarded it to be of concern to them.
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 Risk analysis for VTS area: Seafarers 15- (68%) did see the absence of undertaking
a risk analysis for the VTS area to be of a contributing factor to maritime accidents
at port approaches. Nine out of twelve masters think that it plays a vital role in
accident development (see Appendix I.01).
In addition to IMO / IALA guidelines, the following (as shown in Figure 8) is regarded
to be of interest by shipboard staff to include when regulating a VTS area to better
mitigate maritime accidents at port approaches.

Figure 9 - Factors seen to be of legal importance at port approaches.
Source; Author, 2011
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4.2.3 Research Question 3
Are there KPI or benchmarks for VTS to be regarded as good for mitigating maritime
accident?
The findings as received from anonymous responses to the questionnaires are shown in
Table 6; the findings include responses received from seafarers and VTS centres or
competent authorities . Data was filtered and categorized for displaying as per Table 6.
Table 6 - Suggested VTS Benchmarks/ KPI factors
Research
Qstn

Q3

Item
Total Population
Ranks on board

12
Master

Vessel tracking/monitoring and warning
Safety advices/information
Number of incidents and near misses
navigational assistance
traffic organisation instructions
risk analysis for VTS area
Availability of standard operation
procedures
Use of Communication Marker

No. of participants
5
2
3
Chief Second Third

Sum
22

12
11
11
9
8
9

4
5
4
4
3
3

2
2
1
2
2
1

3
3
2
3
3
2

21
21
18
18
16
15

10

4

1

0

15

6

2

1

3

12

Source; Author, 2011

The main quesionnaire results are as shown below :
 The ability of the VTS centre to track, monitor and warn vessels within the VTS area
was agreed upon by 21- (96%); however, there were some who wanted the service to
extend beyond the area, i.e. to warn the vessel whenever it is in danger.
 16- (73%) of the partacipents, said yes to reciving traffic organisation instructions
from VTSO. Other services (parameters), as they apear on Figure 10, are accepted at
a higher rate as per the results displayed in the same figure.
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 In addition to the proposed factors, some of the respondents suggested other factors
such as qualification of the VTSO, sea experience, and number of complaints
registered at the VTS.

Figure 10 - Factors to consider when setting up VTS centre KPI
Source: Author, 2011
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4.3

Other findings
The questionnaire was also sent to various competent VTS authorities / centres.

Different questions were asked regarding the availability of national regulation for VTS
activities, bodies responsible for VTS operations and the announcement of the VTS at
national and international levels (see Appendix F) . About 50 potential participants were
invited to take part in the survey; only fourteen centres participated in the survey, 4 from
the Middle East, 3 from Africa, 4 from the European Union, 2 from the Far East and
Canada (see Appendix J).
Figure 11, shows participants who said yes to the questions asked.

Figure 11 - VTS centers positive responses to questions.
Sources: Author 2011
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The questionnaire findings revealed that:
 VTSO training requirements were not a national requirement more than VTS
authority administrative settings; 11 of 14 centers had this as a requirement for
VTSO.
 VTSO licensing was a requirement in only half of the participated VTS centres.
 VTS responsibilities have been highlighted in national law within 11 participants.
 KPI was regarded as the last priority in some VTS centres (only 4 out of 14 centers
said they have some sort of KPI) while others regarded benchmarks to be in line with
IALA VTS Guidelines in which all EU VTS were doing annual internal as well as
external audits every five years. Matters of internal procedures were audited only,
thus missing the quality at a global level.
 The management of most participated VTS centres are managed by the public sector,
while there are few others which are managed by private oil terminals that only
cover traffic management to and from the terminal.
 The publicity of established VTS centres has been kept close to the stakeholders,
mainly ships and pilots via ―Admiralty List of Radio Signals Vol. 6 & 7‖18. Only 7
published their VTS centers at national level while IMO was informed only about 4
out of 14 VTS centres surveyed.

18

As per MCA, MGN 239, ―Statutory Harbour Authorities should provide the details above to the MCA,
who are the UK‘s Competent Authority for VTS, for compilation of the UK VTS database and to UKHO
for promulgation of appropriate details in the Admiralty List of Radio Signals Volume 6 and on Admiralty
Chart(s). Ports with VTS services are encouraged to provide details to IALA for promulgation on the
World VTS Guide website‖. Furthermore, UK HO, ALRS Vol. 6. Gives list of ports around the world
together with procedures to be followed for reporting and ordering of pilots.
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4.4

Summary
The questionnaire results was structured around the three research questions. The

findings is summarized below:


Local shipping traffic density and shipboard officers‘ area experience were seen as
the highest hazards at port approaches that need to be mitigated.



Busy VHF communication channels and VTSO sea experience are also considered
as hazard factors.



Lack of regulating VTS functions (tracking, monitoring and warning) is seen as the
main accidents development factor in VTS areas.



The absence of accidents and near miss records were regarded as another accident
waiting to happen, if the new risk was not eliminated or minimized.



VTS centers ought to have its own standard operation procedures, while VTSO
should be held accountability but not liable for accidents within VTS areas.



Not all VTS centers require a VTSO to be licensed, but have some sort of training
requirements at VTS authority requirement level.



Few VTS centers have consider the measure of KPI or benchmarks. However it is
restricted to operational procedures of internal and external audit program.



The centre‘s ability to optimize and control its services has been regarded as a
benchmark by seafarers.



Most VTS are managed by the public sector, yet some oil terminals have their own
VTS traffic control. While the publications of VTS centres at national and IMO level
have not been adequate, they were limited to information contained within the
ALRS.
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CHAPTER
5.1

5

RESULTS OF INTERVIEWS

Introduction
In this section the result of the interviews conducted is presented. Semi

structured interviews were used to either confirm the results derived from the
questionnaire or to find additional information. A list of questions were used to facilitate
the interview process (see Appendix H). The participants were either VTS experts (one),
managers (two) and regulators (one).

5.2

Questions and interview transcripts
Answers to the interview questions will be summarized; however, quotations

from the interviews will be used during the discussion process in the next chapter.
5.2.1


Risks with ships when approaching port area

The spoken language on board and difficulties to communicate with the ships in the
VTS area.



Perception of the bridge team regarding the area to be transited, and pushing of
safety factors to the limit especially maximum allowable draft and transit time.



Failure to keep the AIS ―on‖ for easy ships‘ identification by the VTS centre.



Lack of coordination between VTS centres and pilots.



Difficulties in detecting ships not required to carry AIS on board.

5.2.2

Factors to consider when evaluating the performance of the VTS centre



Meeting the IMO and IALA guidelines and standards.



Different KPI for each VTS area location especially between river and sea VTS
centers.



Reporting of information to EMSA in line the EU directives.

5.2.3


VTSO contribution to accident development at port approaches

Overloading the bridge team with non-relevant information.
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Failure to monitor the allocated VTS area during VTSO watch period.



Lack of coordination with the pilots and other allied services.

5.2.4


Regulating the interaction of VTSO with ships inside and outside VTS area

The VTS area is divided into subsections and two types of VTSO are allocated to
interact with ships inside the VTS area; the pilot boarding area (area of high risk as
commented by one interviewee) is controlled by a VTSO, who is also a pilot; other
areas are also divided according to the risks involved.



The issue of outside VTS area is left to the Coast Guard (CG), where a VTSO spots
a ship doing something which is not correct, he will advice the CG to deal with it.



For inside VTS area, a VTSO is expected to follow the procedures in place;
however, outside the VTS area, there is no written regulations in place, but the
VTSO is expected to use his best judgment at the time to avoid an imminent disaster
(two interviewees concur).

5.2.5


VTSO accountability with regard to accidents inside the VTS area

He will be held questionable to the VTS manager and only administrative
disciplinary actions will be taken including the removal from the centre, but he will
not be held liable, yet the centre may be held liable in accordance with the national
law.



The issue of legal liability has never been discussed with the VTSO as it has never
been an issue till now.

5.2.6

Harmonization of VTS regulations around the world

All interviewees agree that regulating VTS to an international standard will benefit the
ships more, but may require refining in accordance with the regional regulations and
requirements e.g. EU rules may not be welcomed in other countries. IMO / IALA
guidelines may be used as a minimum requirements for VTS centers.
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CHAPTER
6.1

6

DISCUSSION

Introduction
This chapter reviews and advances the study findings presented in the previous

chapter. It is organised in four sections. The first section briefly summarizes the
observations concerning the wide spread use of the word VTS within the ports and
terminals domains around the world. This is followed by a discussion of the study
findings as it relates to the three research questions. The last section gives a summary of
the chapter.

6.2

Observations
It is not hard to find the wide spread use of the word VTS within the shipping

domain, which may and may not reflect the true meaning of the VTS as assumed and
defined by the IMO and the IALA. Looking at ALRS Vol. 6 & 7 for port controls and
pilots will give a spectrum of locations around the world to apparently mean port control
(or LPS) more than the true meaning of a VTS. Moreover, some VTS centres are
becoming multi-task centres in quest of optimising resources and the onset of
practicalities. This was endorsed via the EU research project (MarNIS) into ―Maritime
traffic management and control‖ which developed the ―Maritime Operational Services
(MOS)‖19 concept in recognition of the VTS practical settings.

19

EU Commission, Thematic Research Summary: ―Intelligent transport systems‖, Transport Research
Knowledge Centre. Prepared by Zuzana Sitavancová & Martin Hájek, Date 02/04/2009.
http://www.eurosfaire.prd.fr/7pc/doc/1257760616_trs_intelligent_transport_systems_2009.pdf
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6.3

Discussion of research questions
The overall objective of this study is to highlight the way VTS is regulated by

international bodies, namely IMO and IALA, and also the implication of such
regulations on mitigating maritime accidents at port approaches. Furthermore, the
purpose of this study was to first investigate risk factors that need to be mitigated in
areas of port approaches as perceived by shipboard officers. The second part was to look
at VTS centre involvement in accidents developments and their liabilities. The last
section describes VTS benchmarks/KPI parameters.
A total of twenty two (22) participants‘ answers to the questionnaire were received from
seafarers, fourteen (14) from VTS centre / competent authorities and four (4) interviews
were conducted together with the other sources of data gathering mechanisms were used
to answer the three research questions discussed in chapter four. Through a qualitative
data analysis, the following is a discussion of the study as it relates to the three questions
and other findings.

6.3.1 Research Question 1
What are the risks that need to be mitigated in areas of port approaches?
The risk level exonerated on ships increases as it comes closer to land especially
port approaches, while port risk levels fluctuated subject to many factors (external
―beyond the control of the port authority, like weather and abnormal conditions
including the departure from international law requirements‖ and internal ―management
policies‖). Many maritime safety authorities around the world especially in the EU
countries have made it mandatory to carryout risk assessments for their operations
accordingly. Guidelines for Port & Harbour Risk Assessment and Safety Management
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Systems in New Zealand20, gives a ―Derived Hazard List‖ for port approaches; however,
it does not apparently take into account shipboard influenced risk factors. The US Coast
Guard, also apply a similar strategy ―Ports And Waterways Safety Assessment
(PAWSA)‖ within port approaches / VTS areas, as ―the process is expected to provide a
basis for making best value decisions for risk mitigation investments, both on the local
and national level‖21. The PAWSA which was conducted in 2008 for the New York VTS
area, post the allision of MT Axel Spirit22 with Ambrose light on the early morning of
03rd Nov 2007, among the risks identified was VTS VHF saturation, which was also
identified from the research survey bearing in mind that the PAWSA was conducted by
a New York VTS stakeholder workshop. Other results ―Congestion, Traffic Mix‖ were
also similar.
Master and officer area experience ―19- (86%)‖ was regarded to be as one of the highest
risk factor in the VTS area, inspite of SOLAS requirements regarding voyage planning
while using the on board publication to draw a true picture of the area; again the MT
Axel Spirit highlighted the same points the survey found.
The area experience and local shipping traffic density draws on the same number 19(86%) of agreement, which was not a surprise to the researcher. It could be an
acceptable risk to the local people who are so used to seeing it every day. Thus the
foreign master may get himself into problems just by the mere fact of fear because of his
perception, yet he could be right if the port has never handled such a ship before, so that
is why they go onto simulation before accepting it.

20

New Zealand Maritime Safety Authority, 2004. Guidelines for Port & Harbour Risk Assessment and
Safety Management Systems.
21
US CG Ports And Waterways Safety Assessment (PAWSA), sited 18.09.2011 from
http://www.navcen.uscg.gov/?pageName=pawsaMain
22

US NTSB, Accident Report; NTSB/MAR-09/02, PB2009-916402. Sited on 20.07.2011 from
http://www.ntsb.gov/doclib/reports/2009/MAR0902.pdf
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The response to any question varied subject to the shipboard rank (experience) and age.
Therefore, masters gave wiser answers to certain questions, while junior officers
responded well to e-related questions (electronically track and monitor vessels‘
movements). Apparently the questions were a surprise to the shipboard staff, especially
with regard to the question of ―ship board knowledge regarding VTS‖.
The widespread use of UK HO ALRS Vol. 6 & 7 regarding port controls ―VTS‖
suppressed the ―Lack of VTS area information question‖ as being one of the hazards
regarded by ships‘ staff. In this respect the UK HO was asked by e-mail ―if they had any
specific prerequisite for VTS to be listed as VTS in the ALRS‖. The answer was ―NO‖ it
is done based on network and direct questions to individual ports / terminals.
VTSO English language command was not regarded to be a hazard to port approaches.
This could be because more ports are realising the importance and have ensured that
only those that have good English command are operating the VTS centres or terminal
operators are becoming global. However, a Canadian Coast Guard study23concluded that
―the matter of foreign language, the service received is acceptable to well. The service,
however, is not of very great importance and therefore is not likely to ensure VTM
effectiveness in reducing marine accidents‖. One interviewee commented that a risk may
arise because of the spoken language on board and difficulties to communicate with the
ship in the VTS area, but today there is always a young officer on board who can speak
English.
Captain Terry Hughes, reiterate in his article24, what apparently every VTS centre is
challenged with when communicating with ships ―one of the problems facing VTSOs is
language and the difficulties in communicating with multilingual crew abroad vessels,
23

Canadian Coast Guard VTS study conducted and published in Oct. 1984. The study is related to marine
risk reduction and the VTS.
24
Hughes, T. (2011). When is VTS not a VTS? Part 2. Port Technology International, Edition 45 -VTMIS
& Aids to Navigation. Retrieved on 20.08.2011 from
http://www.porttechnology.org/images/uploads/technical_papers/40-43.pdf
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particularly in times when a vessel is navigating in a haphazard way‖ (Hughes, 2011,
p.2).
The use of VTS communication markers was considered to be a problem for 9- (41%)
out of which are 6 masters. The recent grounding accident25 highlights a true example of
the use of communication markers, the VTSO said as cited by a MAIB report ―All ships
standby, all ships standby. Maersk Kendal warning to you. Ahead of you is Samho
Jewelry, Samho Jewelry, What is your intention over?‖, so was this master out of the six
who said yes?
The study along with other contextual literature, recognises the need to regulate such risks;
however, identifying elements of risk in its general term that may be used around the

world proved to be a more difficult task than anticipated, because there are certain
elements that are inherited within any given industry. The concept of listing risks to be
mitigated at port approaches will be unique to each port approach. Other factors to
consider in addition to the standard risks factors, would also include: ship‘s staff area
experience, VTSO ship‘s awareness and expectations, local shipping traffic density and
finally busy VHF working channels as the study survey showed. It is apparent that
certain risk factors have been solved in certain regions (EU) but is surfacing in another
region (like the PSC issue) ―The Arabian Gulf is of mixed quality VHF channels
seriously overcrowded‖ (NI, 1999 survey). The elimination of such risk in some region
is due to robust VTS regulations coupled with strict enforcement mechanisms, including
fines and the use of technology to capture evidence at VTS centers.

25

Marine Accident Investigation Branch, Report No 2/2010 March 2010, Report on the investigation of
the grounding of mv Maersk Kendal on Monggok Sebarok reef in the Singapore Strait on September 16th
2009. Retrieved on 20.08.2011 from
http://www.maib.gov.uk/cms_resources.cfm?file=/Maersk_Kendal_Report.pdf
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6.3.2 Research Question 2
How can VTS (operators) be involved in accident development and what is their
liability?
The findings suggest that 21– (96%) of the participants believe that lack of
properly regulating the VTS main functions ―vessel tracking / monitoring and warning‖
can lead to an accident development, ―The master and chief officer became irritated by the
frequent interventions by VTMIS, which resulted in important information from VTMIS
being missed‖26. It has been suggested by one of the interviewee that the quality of the
information is important at that instant “is it too much information, which is no good,
because then I get crazy, all this information or is it the information which I need at
that moment”, basically given the correct relevant information to the correct ship which
will aid the master to take the appropriate action and to avoid bridge team information
overload. Other matters of concern to ships‘ staff as the Nautical Institute council survey27
found out is ―VTS can demand information which can be very distracting at critical times‖,
miss-coordination between pilot, VTS and terminals.

IMO resolution A.857 (20), 2.2 stipulates responsibilities and liability of contracting
governments when setting up a VTS. Among others, it should ensure that there is legal
basis for the operation of the VTS in accordance with national and international laws.
Furthermore, in 2.2.4, the liability element is highlighted to be as ―a case-by-case basis
in accordance with national law‖. Thus a VTS authority is asked to consider ―the legal
implications in the event of a shipping accident where VTS operators may have failed to
carry out their duty competently‖. The survey result coincided with the IMO resolution
regarding the liability issue, in which 16– (73%) believed that a VTSO should be held
accountable if an accident occurred within his VTS area because of negligence which

26
27

MAIB accident investigation report into the grounding of MV Maersk Kendal in Singapore strait, 2009.
The Nautical Institute council survey, on VTS conducted on 20.12.1999 by CJP/JEM and

was presented at the International Harbour Master Association (IHMA) in Malta 2006.
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has to be proven in the court of law. The recent grounding28 of M.V. Alva on 17th
August 2011 in the Sound North East of Ven Island brought about major change within
the coverage of the Sound VTS to cover the whole bay, thus extending the VTS
responsibility area. Furthermore, it was confirmed by one of the interviewees (VTS
manager) that VTSOs are held accountable if an accident takes place within the VTS
coverage area but is not liable. A Canadian VTS study29 affirms this settings ―a definite
statement of liability with respect to a regulator for an act of omission occurring in the
course of his or her duties can only be made by the courts based on the facts of a specific
case‖. Similar setting is followed in the UK, South Africa, the US and others.
Furthermore, the issue of VTS ―duty of care‖ was the centre point of ―master mariners
of Australia congress‖30, it was highlighted among other points that ―a VTSO duty of
care is to be proactive and act in such a way as to improve safety (i.e. watch and warn)
and to prevent vessels from grounding or colliding and thereby causing damage to the
environment. VTSO may be liable should they fail to warn‖.
19– (86%) of the participants regarded the failure by the VTS centre to capture and
regulate near misses or accidents that may have departed from the original perceived risk
assessment can be a contributor to accidents developments in VTS areas in the future.
Associated British Ports (ABP) has incorporated a new risk management tool (Accident
and Incident Reporting Module) within its ―Port Marine Safety Management System‖31
by the European MarNIS Project in June 2008. The database compares existing hazards
due to actual accidents or incidents which had already been assessed and should be
reviewed or it is a new hazard that need to be added and assessed for future reference.
28

Turkey Seanews. Drunken Latvian captain ran ship aground. Sited on 10.09.2011 from
http://www.seanews.com.tr/article/ACCIDENTS/68832/andlt;alva-Aground-Drunken-Captain/
29
Canadian Coast Guard, October 1984. Vessel Traffic Services Study - Final Report. Transport Canada.
30
Buuren, E.V. April 2011. VTS in Australia, perspectives for pilots and mariners. Master Mariners of
Australia Congress. Norton Rose Australia.
31
ABP, (2009). Port Marine Safety Management System. Marine Advisor‘s Office. Version 1.1. sited on
19.09.2009 from http://www.southwalesports.co.uk/files/abp%20sms%20manual%20ver1_1.pdf
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The use of communication makers was not considered to be a problem for the majority
of the respondents; however, 9- (40%) regarded it to be of concern to them and was
limited to officers originating from the Middle East, ISC, and Africa, which is
apparently because of either the VTS centers in the above regions are not using the
correct VTS communication protocols or the ability of officers to switch mode as they
communicate with different regional VTS centres.
Captain Terry Hughes, ask if the VTS regulations were lacking, ―Over the years VTS
has been developed almost in a total legal vacuum and only now, when the systems are
actually in operation in many parts of the world, are hurried questions being asked about
regulatory aspects, legal responsibilities and liability‖.
The study found that regulating the VTS functions is a necessity to mitigate maritime
accidents at port approaches rather than leaving the VTS centres and its stakeholders
with the dilemma, while offering issues that were considered by the survey participants
to be of importance which ought to be included when regulating VTS in addition to the
national settings.
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6.3.3 Research Question 3
Are there KPI or benchmarks for VTS to be regarded as good for mitigating maritime
accident?
VTS centres have always worked in silence with regard to their achievements in
evading many accidents involving ships approaching ports or transiting VTS areas. The
researcher believes good VTSO centres are self disciplined and work with instinct rather
than rigid procedures. However, not all VTSOs will have that basic instinct which will
render the quality of the centre; henceforth, the need to establish some KPI to ensure
consistency all the time.
Captain Drouin, indicates in an article32 that safety must have objectives ―without safety
performance measurement criteria (established safety objectives) middle management is
cast adrift and without clear direction ... what gets measured gets done or If you don‘t
measure it you can‘t manage it‖. In this case, an accident free VTS area as indicated by
one interviewee ―no accident because VTS operator‖. The finding conclude the ability of
a VTS centre to effectively track, monitor and warn ships in time, is regarded by 21–
(95%) shipboard officers to be as a good indicator for the performance of that centre.
The type of safety advice and information were also seen by 21–(95%) to be a good
indicator to realize the quality of a VTS centre. The quality of such information usually
sets the officers perception every time they are in the same area, in which the advice or
information given saved the ship from danger.
Availability of navigational assistance within a VTS area and its quality are also seen to
be a good KPI. This is a very important service that a VTS centre can offer especially to
a bridge team who lacks area experience, and wishes to follow the port‘s regulations.
The NI survey shows participants considering the ―most useful advice is guidance up to
32

Seaways, 2010, Oct. Article by Capt Paul Drouin MNI, The building blocks of a safety culture.
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pilot embarkation‖ especially during restricted visibility. Furthermore, this service is
strictly regulated in the UK in accordance with MGN 40133.
Other factors to consider when setting up a KPI is the number of accidents and near
misses a VTS area may be allowed to have before it is considered as a bad performer;
19- (86%) participants saw this issue to be of high priority, so this will give ships‘ staff
and other maritime organizations something to think about with regard to giving
technical assistance (in the case of the IMO) and may be beneficial to improve the safety
records which are reflected in the number of accidents in a VTS area. This strategic
issue will have to be decided by upper management, which is subjected to the available
resources and the risk acceptability criteria. IALA Guideline no. 1055, gives reference to
the issue of ―Performance Measures‖ undertaken to evaluate the effectiveness of the
VTS, e.g. the analysis of accidents and incidents. This shows the importance of the issue
that the maritime community would like to see actions taken to reduce it or eliminate it.
An important distinction to make, is the lowest number within the reaserch survey
regarding the use of VTS communication markers. Only 9– (41 %) who said yes;
therefore the respondents did not know the issue or were able to switch communication
mode between regions.
Two other important findings to note are: masters‘ agreement (10 out of 12 masters)
regulating the VTS via Standard Operation Procedures (SOP) compared with third
officers. The second one is, masters‘ reluctance to accept traffic organistion instructions
(8 out of 12 masters) compared to other ranks. This is apparently in line with the
masters‘ overall responsibilies and the region they come from. Full frequancy
distribution among officer rankings and the population perception regarding elements of
KPI should included in any VTS centre as seen by the shipboard staff is shown in Table
6.
33

In accordance with MGN 401, Navigational Assistance Service (NAS) may only be undertaken by a
dedicated VTSO. See item 7.7.4 on page 9 of the same MGN for more details.
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In addition to the research study findings, Professor Allen, indicated in his report several
items that may be used as KPI / benchmarks: ―the use of case study in evaluating VTS
policy options‖, the use of selected scenarios for VTSO training that cover the full range
of the VTS management including the full range of environmental conditions for the
area, acceptable analytical methods to fully measure the effectiveness of VTS systems
relative to the factors that affect operational risks, ability to provide good quality and
unambiguous information. In one interview, the participant indicated the use of the
actual cases for refining actions should have been taken, in addition to amending the
procedures.

6.4

Other findings
In order to explore the way VTS are regulated around the world, about 50 e-

mails were sent worldwide, but only 14 questionnaires were received from different
regions as shown in Appendix K.
VTSO training was a requirement set by the VTS authority more than a national
regulation set by the competent authority. Apparently, this training was not done in
accordance with IMO and IALA guidelines in some regions, especially developing
countries.
Licensing of VTSOs was again a matter of VTS authority rather than an obligation set
by the competent authority. As the study showed, there is no general acceptance of VTS
licensing in the Middle East (0) since it is only guidelines compared with STCW
Certificate of Competency (CoC.) The majority of VTS centres around the world are
managed by public service (government), but there are few which are dually managed
e.g. Tampa and Los Angles in the US; however, there are oil terminals around the world
who are running VTS for shipping traffic organising into the terminal which are
apparently not regulated as per the IMO / IALA guidelines.
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Almost all VTS centres have no measures of KPI or benchmark to work on, for example
4 out of 14 centres had some sort of KPI which is actually adhered to IALA audit
requirements as stipulated in Chapter 18 of the IALA VTS manual 2008. KPI or
benchmarks are not regarded as priority in most of the centres because they are more
concerned with the day to day running of the centre.
From a business prospective, a KPI is something that management support team should
prepare and give it to the VTSO to adhere to. On the other hand, Canada does have KPI
for the VTS centres which is set by the centre, thus not uniform all over Canada. The
issue of performance evaluation was highlighted in a recent IMO document34 regarding
VIMSAS coastal States obligation findings ―Another concern is the lack of evaluation of
performance on safety of navigation and SAR‖, which include the VTS as per the preaudit IMO VIMSAS questionnaire. A research study about the ―Quality Coastal State
Pilot Study‖35 remarked within the report among other things, the difficulties in
identifying the quality of VTS due to non respondence of the competent authorities
around the world.

6.5

Summary
Questionnaire results are further discussed in this chapter. The discussions

triangulated all available information from contextual information, questionnaire results
and information from other relevant studies (introduced in this chapter) in order to
correlate the findings and the existing results where available.

34

IMO, 2010. Review of the code for the implementation of mandatory IMO instruments. FSI 18/INF.7.
Retrieved
on
September,
21
2011
from
WWW:
http://docs.imo.org/Search.aspx?keywords=%22FSI+18%2fINF.7%22
35
Internal Report to the Round Table of Shipping Organisations on the Criteria and Measures of a
―Quality Coastal State‖ Study. Maria Anne Wagtmann & Kristen Nedergaard, Univ. of Southern
Denmark.
Retrieved
on
Augest,
29
2011
from
WWW:
http://www.dendanskemaritimefond.dk/public/dokumenter/Full%20Report%20Quality%20Coastal%20St
ate%20Pilot%20Study%20sa.pdf
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CHAPTER 7
7.1

CONCLUSIONS and RECOMMONDATIONS

Conclusion 1

Risk is always in a state of flux at port approaches, requiring proactive mitigation
measures
Hazard identification generally comprises a combination of both creative and
analytical techniques, and the emphasis has lately been on the creative and proactive
methods involving the primary VTS staff (VTSO) in quest of shifting from static
hazards identified in the past. IMO and IALA do not offer a readymade hazard / risk list
for port approaches apart from the conditions requiring the consideration of VTS
deployment.
The study along with other contextual literature, recognises the need to regulate all type
of risks; however, identifying elements of risk in its general term that may be used
around the world proved to be a more difficult task than anticipated, because risks are
always in a state of flux at port approaches, also there are certain elements that are
inherited within any given industry. The concept of listing risks to be mitigated at port
approaches is unique to each port approach around the world and is subjected to several
factors, yet there are factors that need to be considered, which can be generalised. This
would include ship‘s staff area experience, VTSO ship‘s awareness and expectations,
local shipping traffic density and finally busy VHF working channels as the study survey
showed.
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7.2

Conclusion 2

Regulating VTS, international guidelines and a national obligation toward VTS
stakeholders
Regulating main VTS functions in a harmonized way around the world is seen by
shipboard officers as a necessity towards mitigating maritime accidents at port
approaches. Responsibilities and liability of contracting governments are set out in IMO
Resolution A.857 (20), 2.2. It should ensure that there is legal basis for the operation of
the VTS in accordance with national and international laws while the liability element is
highlighted to be as ―a case-by-case basis in accordance with national law‖.
Failure by VTS centres to track, monitor and warn vessels inside VTS areas is a major
factor in accidents that can be avoided by VTSO actions, which is regarded by some
courts as negligence by the VTS centre in exercising due diligence and is left to the
court to decide. A VTSO is held accountable but not liable (subject to national statues
settings) if an accident occurs within his VTS area
The absence of VTS area risk analysis, standard operation procedures, the VTS demand
for information at critical times, and finally miss-coordination between pilot and VTS are

contributing factors to maritime accidents at port approaches. Furthermore, the failure by
the VTS centre to capture and regulate near misses or accidents that may have departed
from the original perceived risk assessment can be a contributor to accidents
developments in VTS areas.
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7.3

Conclusion 3

VTS benchmarking to justify its importance in mitigating maritime accidents
Almost all VTS centres have no measures of KPI or benchmarks to work on;
some centres are regarding the adherence to IALA audit requirements as stipulated in
Chapter 18 of the IALA VTS Manual 2008 as a benchmark for their work.
KPI or benchmarks are not a priority in most of the centres because they are more
concerned with the day to day running of the centre. Apparently KPI is seen by VTS
centres as a strange word coming into the VTS maritime safety domain that may distract
the VTS centre from its main objective of preventing accidents in the VTS area.
Benchmarking / KPI is a managerial domain more than a VTSO concern. Introducing
benchmarks at VTS centres will leverage the port in marketing its self as safe port as
supported by the VTS KPI. The use of indicators can be used for internal process
improvements as well as external towards optimizing the resources available.
The study recognized at least four main operational KPIs that may be used to measure
the performance of the VTS; ability of the VTS centre to track, monitor and warn
vessels within the VTS area, delivery of navigational assistance, safety advice /
information, qualification of the VTSO and his sea experience, and the number of
complaints registered at the VTS.
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7.4

Self reflection on the study
This section gives a reflection of the researcher‘s account of this study. The

study is explanatory in nature and tries to establish the importance of different elements
as perceived by shipboard officers, which ought to be incorporated when regulating VTS
centres. The research was focused on studying shipboard officers‘ perceptions with
regard to elements that ought to be regulated from an operational point of view.
The survey questionnaire answers was drawn from different nationalities, age and ranks
found onboard ships. Regulating VTS is a government obligation but is affecting VTS
stakeholders including shipboard officers. Taking their mind set into the risk
identifications, quality index and the issue of VTS centre behaviour when delivering its
services can add more value to the regulations. Regulated VTS centres as required by
IMO and IALA guidelines, should look for other matters that can capitalise on their
current investment to mitigate maritime accidents at port approaches. One way is to
educate the VTSO on the impact of their actions with regard to the behaviour of their
counterparts on board ships and the magnitude of cultural differences.
The issue of a VTS doing multi-tasks at port approaches means more software is needed
that can automatically capture and store information ready to be retrieved by others like
customs, pilots, and health officer. This will have to be recognised by the maritime
society as a whole and by the VTS authority. The issue of culture remains a great
obstacle in public dominated employees service, where complaints or a past record data
base are not desirable in some regions. Sooner or later, VTS centres will be asked to
justify the enormous amount of money spent on the establishment of VTS in a trendy
outsourcing environment. The purpose of regulating VTS is to create more efficient
processes in order to fulfil the objectives of maritime safety towards safer, secure oceans
and cleaner environment.
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7.5

Lessons learned from the study
The researcher‘s education and experience in the field of shipping helped in

understanding the needs of regulating VTS in any country irrespective of its
international obligations. The elements of technology have always fascinated the
researcher‘s curiosity into finding better use for it to enhance the work process, yet
studying at World maritime University (WMU) brought about new prospective into
regulating matters in an international setting.
Choosing this topic exposed the researcher to a variety of opinions and gave an in depth
prospective on how VTS centres are regulated including the importance of different
elements within those regulations together with the issue of liability in court.
There are certain experts who have written in English about the subject of VTS;
however, there may be others who have written in different languages and the researcher
was not able to read the same.
After doing this research, it is apparent to me that, the study will help the Bahrain
Maritime Safety Department in regulating its current VTMS towards fulfilling its
obligations as per SOLAS Chapter V, regulation 13 regarding VTS. Further, this will
answer many of the IMO VIMSAS audit questions.
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7.6

Recommendations
The study aimed to explore and explain how VTS regulations can mitigate

maritime accidents at port approaches while understanding the value of regulating
elements as perceived by the shipboard officers. The findings have important
implications to competent VTS authorities. Based on the study results, the researcher in
this section proposes the following strategies /recommendations (implications);
1.

Risks at port approaches have not been static over the years. It is highly
recommended that the VTSO be trained on how they can identify new or
unpredictable risk at their VTS area.

2.

The establishment of new risk register at VTS centres, preferably in electronic
format to capture new risks as they are experienced by the VTSO for later
assessment.

3.

Identified risks (old and new) should be disseminated to all VTSOs serving at the
VTS centre.

4.

When regulating VTS at a procedural level, due care should be taken to include a
chapter on dealing with new risks as they develop.

5.

The accountability and liability issues of the VTSO in case of an accident in the
VTS area should be brought to the attention of the VTSO in accordance with the
national law and internal procedures.

6.

Table top exercises should be done monthly to cover new discovered risks and
ways of dealing with them.

7.

While it is often possible to distinguish between requirements, expectations, and
wants at any one point in time, VTS customers‘ view may change. Measuring
customers‘ satisfaction on a regular basis is a must to study this shift which is
necessary to sustain maritime safety levels at VTS areas and to re-engineer the
process as required. It is also important to measure the employees‘ satisfaction
with their current jobs and benefits.
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8.

When setting up KPI for VTS centres, the stakeholders‘ opinion including
shipboard officers‘ visiting the area should be considered.

9.

Cross government agency meetings including pilots should be highly encouraged
to discuss customers‘ service problems and develop acceptable practical solutions
for them.

10.

Publication of VTS data on the web is recommended to minimize the use of the
telephone which may distract the VTSOs from their main job.

11.

The concept of Maritime Operational Services (MOS) should be adopted by the
IMO to optimise developing nations‘ resources when offering technical assistance.

7.7

Summary
The study intended to show how VTS regulations can mitigate maritime

accidents at port approaches, thus achieving a manageable maritime accident rate aimed
at protecting the environment.
Through an explanatory inductive research the qualitative research method was used
while utilising semi-structured interviewing techniques and questionnaires in addition to
observations to collect primary data. At the same time secondary data were used to
conclude the findings. The implication in this chapter and the findings presented in the
previous chapters, highlight the need to regulate VTS centres in a harmonized way and
to ensure a high standard VTS is maintained throughout the VTS operations. It is
concluded that risks are always in a state of flux at port approaches, requiring holistic
mitigation via different risk mitigation options including regulating the VTS centre and
area. Regulating VTS is an international quest and a national obligation toward
protecting VTS stakeholders interest in view of maintaining a high standard of maritime
safety. VTS benchmarking / KPI will justify its importance in mitigating maritime
accidents within VTS areas and at port approaches. This requires a focus on leadership,
strategy, internal process, customers and meaning-full ROI in order to yield the desired
results.
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7.8

Future Research
Finally, the findings suggest that regulating a VTS should include matters that

can affect the power to better mitigate a maritime accident at port approaches, while
counting the consequences of failing to exercise due care and diligence, in the watching
eye of the shipboard officers and the maritime community as a whole towards
sustainable VTS center quality.
New policies and guidelines are required to draw the relationship between the VTS
outsourcing (operated by oil terminals or private port operators ―in developing nations‖)
and the competent VTS authority /government to encompass State obligations, and
needs while sustaining commerciality at any given time.
Future research should explain new policies and guidelines in the wake of port
privatizations to ensure that VTS if outsourced, remain the IMO member States‘
responsibility that can be audited in 2015 through the IMO Mandatory Audit Scheme.
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APPENDICES
Appendix A: Hazards identified at port approaches
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

•
•
•
•
•
•

Unregulated Notification Of Arrival (NOA) for vessels arriving port approaches.
Difficulties in identifying non SOLAS vessels by VTS and by other ships.
VHF channel crowded.
Port location, Congestion and traffic density.
Environmental conditions; visibility (including time of the day, shore side lightings),
tide and current, wind speed and direction.
Available Aids to navigation (AtoN) at port approaches and their status.
Anticipated vessel encounters; multi direction port approaches like New York, and
most European ports.
Difficulty in knowing other vessel's name, type, position, cargo on board, vessel
operating conditions, if applicable, and intended navigation movements, as reported.
Temporary measures in effect, deployed by local authority e.g. new wreck markings.
A description of local harbour operations and conditions, such as ferry routes,
dredging, local shipping traffic, pattern of local traffic, and so forth.
Anchorage availability, limit markings and marking on charts.
Availability of up to date local VTS information.
Ships‘ collision, allision, fire, explosion, grounding (while under power of drifting),
leaking, damage, injury or illness of a person aboard, or manning shortage,
Certificate of Competency (CoC) and experience of ships‘ staff.
Cargo transfer operations in open water.
Types, size, and draft of ships visiting the port.
Port‘s infrastructures and availability of reliable support (tugs, pilots, VTS).
Out of date charts and nautical publications on board ships.
Lack of frequent sea bed survey and chart updating.
Presence of wrecks and obstructions along fairway or sea lane, port approaches.

Sources;
IMO resolution A.857(20), IALA Guidelines 1018. (2005), US CG regulations ;
33 C.F.R. PART 161—VESSEL TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT, Title 33 - Navigation and Navigable
Waters http://law.justia.com/cfr/title33/33-2.0.1.6.29.html &
33 C.F.R. PART 160—PORTS AND WATERWAYS SAFETY—GENERAL, Title 33 - Navigation and
Navigable Waters. http://law.justia.com/cfr/title33/33-2.0.1.6.28.html . Retrieved on August 28th 2011.
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Appendix B: Marine Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB) e-mail
response
From: MAIB <MAIB@dft.gsi.gov.uk>
Tuesday - August 16, 2011 3:54 PM
To:
"s11110@wmu.se" <s11110@wmu.se>
Subject:
F0007927 Regulating VTS, Dissertation
Attachments: Your right to complain.pdf (9 KB)
20110816 f0007929 All.pdf (76 KB)
20110816_f0007927_Possible_VTS_edited.xls (48 KB)
20110816_Possible_VTS_Edited (2).pdf (300 KB)
----------------------------

[View]
[View]
[View]
[View]

[Open]
[Open]
[Open]
[Open]

[Save
[Save
[Save
[Save

As]
As]
As]
As]

Dear Abdulhusain
Our ref F0007927
I am writing to confirm that the Marine Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB) of the
Department for Transport has now completed its search for the information which you
requested on 22 July and 27 July 2011.
We attach
(1) Tables showing number of Accidents and both Accidents and Hazardous Incidents
that occurred while "On passage" or "Entering or leaving port". These are broken down
to shown the vessel type and allow you to choose either cases in UK waters or cases to
UK vessels. Please note that you cannot add together the figures for UK waters and UK
vessels, if they are added then many cases will be double counted.
Non-UK Flagged vessels are not required to report accidents to MAIB unless they are
both within the 12 nautical mile limit and carrying passengers to or from a UK port,
however if we hear about an accident inside the 12nm limit we will have recorded it.
We will not have recorded cases involving Non-UK Flagged vessels that occurred
outside the 12nm limit (Unless a UK vessel was also involved).
(2) Details of cases where VTS is mentioned in the text, these are for you to review and
generate your own figures for cases where VTS may have contributed to an incident.
To aid you in this details are also provided in an Excel spreadsheet. We suggest that
you make a working copy of the spreadsheet and delete from it those cases you
consider irrelevant.

81

Cases can be cross referenced by means of the Case Number which is the first item to
appear in both the spreadsheet and the summaries. Please note that there may be up
to 6 rows of data per case number (6 vessels in one Accident).
Cases have only been selected if they involve either a Merchant Vessel of 500gt or
more or a fishing vessel. However the spreadsheet and the document contain details
of all vessels in the selected cases. The extra vessels have a grey background in the
spreadsheet so that you can easily remove them if required.
When using the details provided to generate statistics please note that you should
choose to present data for either cases where the 'Vessel Nationality' is "U.K." or cases
where the 'Territorial Water' is "U.K.".
In keeping with the spirit and effect of the Freedom of Information Act, all information
is assumed to be releasable to the public unless exempt. The Department may,
therefore, be simultaneously releasing to the public the information you requested,
together with any related information that will provide a key to its wider context.
If you are unhappy with the way the MAIB has handled your request or with the
decisions made in relation to your request you may complain within two calendar
months of the date of this mail by replying to me at the above address. Please see
attached details of the Department for Transport's complaints procedure and your right
to complain to the Information Commissioner.
If you have any queries about this email, please contact me. Please remember to quote
the reference number above in any future communications.
Tracey Hill
Freedom of Information Officer
Marine Accident Investigation Branch
Mountbatten House
Grosvenor Square
Southampton
SO15 2JU
Tel +44 (0)23 8039 5531
Fax+44 (0)23 8023 2459
maib@dft.gsi.gov.uk
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Appendix B.01: Specimen of accidents reports summary involving VTS

Source; Prepared by MAIB for Abdulhusain Abdulla F0007927 16 August 2011

A specimen page out of 87 pages containing accidents reports summary involving VTS
interaction (positive or negative) or contained within an accident report, sent by MAIB –
UK.
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Appendix B.02: Specimen of accident cases summary involving VTS
Case Number
0447/2005
1882/2005
0447/2005
0075/2006
0164/2006
1156/2006
1279/2006
0004/2006
1156/2006
0124/2007
0172/2007

Incident Type
Collision
Collision
Collision
Contact
Contact
Hazardous Incident
Grounding
Contact
Hazardous Incident
Hazardous Incident
Collision

Location Of Accident
Port/harbour area
Port/harbour area
Port/harbour area
Port/harbour area
Port/harbour area
Port/harbour area
Port/harbour area
Port/harbour area
Port/harbour area
Port/harbour area
Port/harbour area

Harbour Limit
Singapore
Tilbury
Singapore
Milford Haven

Vessel Type
Dry cargo
Dry cargo
Dry cargo
Fish catching/processing
Dry cargo
Passenger
Dry cargo
Dry cargo
Dry cargo
Other commercial
Passenger

Damage
Minor Damage
Material Damage
Minor Damage
Material Damage
Minor Damage
No Damage
No Damage
No Damage
No Damage

0526/2007
1493/2007
1501/2007
1652/2007
0124/2007
0172/2007

Collision
Contact
Grounding
Contact
Hazardous Incident
Collision

Coastal waters
Coastal waters
Port/harbour area
Coastal waters
Port/harbour area
Port/harbour area

Humber
Belfast
Southampton
Liverpool
Liverpool

Tanker/combination carrier
Dry cargo
Other commercial
Dry cargo
Dry cargo
Dry cargo

Material Damage
Material Damage
No Damage
No Damage
Minor Damage

Entering or leaving port
Entering or leaving port
Entering or leaving port
Entering or leaving port
Entering or leaving port
Entering or leaving port

0526/2007
0160/2008
1157/2008
0081/2008
0420/2008

Collision
Grounding
Contact
Grounding
Collision

Coastal waters
Coastal waters
Port/harbour area
River/canal
River/canal

Humber
Clyde
Killingholme
Thames
Manchester

Dry cargo
Dry cargo
Tanker/combination carrier
Tanker/combination carrier
Tanker/combination carrier

Material Damage
Minor Damage
Material Damage
No Damage
Minor Damage

Entering or leaving port
Entering or leaving port
Entering or leaving port
Entering or leaving port
Entering or leaving port

0420/2008
0765/2008
1197/2008
1214/2008
1226/2008
1460/2008
1590/2008
0195/2009
1451/2009
1643/2009
0070/2009
0144/2009
0195/2009

Collision
Collision
Contact
Grounding
Grounding
Contact
Grounding
Hazardous Incident
Collision
Hazardous Incident
Contact
Fire/Explosion
Hazardous Incident

River/canal
Port/harbour area
Port/harbour area
River/canal
Port/harbour area
Port/harbour area
River/canal
Coastal waters
Coastal waters
Coastal waters
Port/harbour area
River/canal
Coastal waters

Manchester
Immingham
London
Humber

Dry cargo
Dry cargo
Dry cargo
Dry cargo
Other commercial
Dry cargo
Dry cargo
Passenger cargo
Dry cargo
Dry cargo
Dry cargo
Dry cargo
Dry cargo

Minor Damage
Minor Damage
Minor Damage
No Damage
No Damage
Material Damage
No Damage
No Damage
Minor Damage
No Damage
Minor Damage
Material Damage
No Damage

Entering or leaving port
Entering or leaving port
Entering or leaving port
Entering or leaving port
Entering or leaving port
Entering or leaving port
Entering or leaving port
Entering or leaving port
Entering or leaving port
Entering or leaving port
Entering or leaving port
Entering or leaving port
Entering or leaving port

0717/2009

Hazardous Incident

Port/harbour area

Aberdeen

Dry cargo

No Damage

Entering or leaving port

0642/2010
0978/2010
0146/2010
1378/2010

Hazardous Incident
Hazardous Incident
Contact
Hazardous Incident

Port/harbour area
Port/harbour area
River/canal
Port/harbour area

Belfast
Humber

Tanker/combination carrier No Damage
Tanker/combination carrier No Damage
Tanker/combination carrier Material Damage
Passenger

0107/2005
1686/2005
1751/2005
1751/2005
1789/2005
0088/2006
0088/2006
1443/2006
1443/2006
2023/2006
Source;
0230/2006
1009/2007
0230/2007

Accident To Person Coastal waters
Grounding
Coastal waters
Hazardous Incident Coastal waters
Hazardous Incident Coastal waters
Hazardous Incident Coastal waters
Hazardous Incident Coastal waters
Hazardous Incident Coastal waters
Hazardous Incident Coastal waters
Hazardous Incident Coastal waters
Collisionby MAIB Coastal
waters
Prepared
for Abdulhusain
Hazardous Incident High seas
Hazardous Incident Coastal waters
Hazardous Incident Coastal waters

Dublin
Hull
Plymouth
Dublin
Liverpool
Liverpool

Heysham
Humber
Humber
London
Humber

Liverpool
Humber

Happened When
Entering or leaving port
Entering or leaving port
Entering or leaving port
Entering or leaving port
Entering or leaving port
Entering or leaving port
Entering or leaving port
Entering or leaving port
Entering or leaving port
Entering or leaving port
Material Damage Entering or leaving port

Dry cargo
No Damage
Dry cargo
Material Damage
Tanker/combination carrier
Dry cargo
Dry cargo
No Damage
Humber
Tanker/combination carrier No Damage
Humber
Tanker/combination carrier No Damage
Dry cargo
Dry cargo
Southampton
Passenger16 August 2011
Minor Damage
Abdulla
F0007927
Tanker/combination carrier No Damage
Passenger
No Damage
Dry cargo
No Damage

Entering or leaving port
Entering or leaving port
Entering or leaving port
Entering or leaving port
On passage
On passage
On passage
On passage
On passage
On passage
On passage
On passage
On passage
On passage
On passage
On passage
On passage

Above is an excel file sheet modified by the researcher for the purpose of data
0230/2007
Hazardous
Incident Coastal
waters
Tanker/combination carrier No Damage
On passage
compilation
and graphic
presentation.
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Appendix C: List of IALA publications for VTS matters

Source; IALA VTS Manual 2008, p 49
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Appendix D: National legislation, statutory instruments and regulatory
guidance
Country

Australia

Hong Kong
SAR, China

Italy

Japan

Netherlands

Primary Legislation

Secondary
Legislation/
Statutory
Instruments

Guidance at
National Level

Byelaws

At National Level: (Applies to
REEFREP only)
Navigation Act 1912
Australian
Maritime
Safety
Authority Act 1991
At State Level : Queensland:
Transport Operations Marine
Safety Act 1994 (TOMSA 1994).
The Shipping and Port Control
Ordinance, Chapter 313 of the
Laws of Hong Kong SAR.

Marine Orders Part 56
(Applies to REEFREP
only). Marine Orders
are subordinate
legislation, made under
the Navigation Act
Regulations under the
TOMSA Act 1994
Sub-legislation: The
Shipping and Port
Control Regulations
(Chapter 313A of the
Laws of Kong Kong
SAR)
Inter-Ministry Decree
(28 January 2004)
Establishment of VTS
system

REEFGUIDE – A
Shipmaster‘s Guide to
the Torres Strait and the
Great Barrier Reef.

N/A at national
level
Regional Harbour
Masters in the State
of Queensland can
direct shipping
within port limits

NA

NA

Coast Guard Directive
001, National
Regulations for VTS

Local Coast Guard
VTS Procedures –
User manuals
Local Coast Guard
Ordinances

Various Cabinet
Orders and
Regulations

Various notices

Various Statute Orders
and ministerial Decrees

None

Port Marine Safety
Code and
accompanying Guide
to Good Practice
Marine Guidance Note
(MGN)
MGN Nos 180,238,239
and 240.
Designation by the
Maritime and
Coastguard Agency as
National Competent
Authority to comply
with the EC Vessel
Traffic Monitoring
Directive.
US Coast Guard Marine
Safety Manual.

Law (7 March 2001, Number 51,
art 5)
Maritime Transport. Pollution
Prevention and Maritime Traffic
Monitoring.
Law for Preventing Collisions at
Sea (1977)
Maritime Traffic Safety Law
(1972)
Port Regulation Law (1948)
Scheepvaartkeerswet (Shipping
Traffic Act 1988

United Kingdom

General:
Harbours, Docks and Piers Act
1847
Harbours Act 1964
European Communities Act 1972
(Sect 2 (2))
Merchant Shipping Act 1995
(Sect 85 & 86)
Local:
An Act setting out the
governance of each port by name.
(e.g. The Milford Haven
Conservancy Act 1983)

Statutory Instruments:
Merchant Shipping
Notices (MSN)
Harbour Revision
Orders
Harbour Empowerment
Orders
The Merchant Shipping
(Vessel Traffic
Monitoring and
Reporting
Requirements)
Regulations 2004

United States of
America

Port and Waterway Safety Act of
1972, as amended.

Code of Federal
Regulations 33CFR,
part 161.

Source: IALA VTS Manual 2008, p 42
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Port or local area
byelaws
established by the
local competent
authority.
Harbour Byelaws
applicable to each
port and its
locality.
Established by the
local competent
authority, subject
to the granting of
relevant powers in
local legislation.

Established by
each local VTS
Authority in the
form of ‗User‘s
Manuals

Appendix E: Shipboard officers questionnaire regarding VTS

Shipboard Officers

Ships‘ Master / Officers.

Dear Sir/Madam.
Please give below your kind opinion to the following questions;
1. What are the risk /hazardous (s) when approaching port area (pilot station) from sea?
a) Busy VHF communication channel

A; Yes.

B; No.

b) Lack of VTS area information.

A; Yes.

B; No.

c) Local shipping traffic density.

A; Yes.

B; No.

d) VTSO lack of good English Language

A; Yes.

B; No.

e) Ship‘s staff VTS awareness/expectation

A; Yes.

B; No.

f) VTSO ship‘s awareness / expectations

A; Yes.

B; No.

g) Master‘s/officer area experience

A; Yes.

B; No.

Others...

2. What would be factors to evaluate the performance of a VTS centre (s)?
a. Vessel tracking/monitoring and warning

A; Yes.

B; No.

b. Number of incidents and near Misses

A; Yes.

B; No.

c. Risk analysis for VTS area

A; Yes.

B; No.

d. Availability of standard operation procedures

A; Yes.

B; No

Others (specify).....
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3. Do you see the use of VTSO communication marker (pre-fix) as a contributor in
accident development at port approaches?

A. Yes

B. No

4. Do you trust information given to you by VTS centre regarding?
a. Safety advices /information.

A. Yes.

B. No

b. Traffic organisation instructions.

A. Yes.

B. No

c. Navigational assistances.

A. Yes.

B. No

5. Do you think a VTSO should be held accountable if an accident takes place?
a. Inside VTS area.
b. Outside VTS area

;

A. Yes.

B. No

A. Yes.

B. No

6. Please specify your;
a.

Rank; ......................................

b.

Age;....................................

c.

Nationality; ....................................

Thank You

88

Appendix F: VTS centre / Competent Authority questionnaire regarding
VTS
Dear Sir/Madam.
Please give below your kind answer to the following questions
1. How many VTS centres do you have? And what type are they?
2. Do regulations exist in your National law regarding VTS centres, VTS personals as
highlighted below and VTS area?
a. Training requirements;

A. Yes.

B. No

b. Licensing of VTSO

A. Yes.

B. No

c. VTS responsibilities/obligation

A. Yes.

B. No

d. Measures (KPI) to evaluate VTS

A. Yes.

B. No.

Other VTS regulations...

3. How do you benchmark (KPI) the quality of your VTS?
4. Who is responsible for VTS operation?
a. Public sector (coast guard, port authority, etc).
b. Private sector (port operator / oil terminal, etc)
5. Are all VTS centres published at ;
a. National level (within the law/ reg.)

A. Yes.

B. No

b. The IMO.

A. Yes.

B. No.

Others. (specify).;.............
Region;
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Appendix G: Specimen of e-mail sent along-with the questionnaire

Dear Sir / Madam,
The purpose of the questionnaire below, is to address a question regarding ―Regulating
VTS to mitigate maritime accidents at port approaches‖. Your participation in this
research questionnaire is important and will be greatly appreciated. Since no names are
requested, there will be complete confidentiality. Your opinion is important to
understand the situation, please take few minutes to answer the questions below.
Many thanks in advance and warmest regards,

Abdulhusain Mansoor Abdulla
Student for ―MSc in Maritime Affairs‖
World Maritime University (WMU) Malmo
Sweden.
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Appendix H: Interview questions to VTS manager

1. What are the risk(s) associated with ships when approaching port area (pilot station)
from sea?
2. What factors do you consider when evaluating the performance of your VTS centre
(s)?
3. Do you see the VTS officer ability as a contributor in accident development at port
approaches?

A. Yes

B. No

4. Do you have regulations regarding the VTSO engagement with ships inside and
outside VTS area to prevent an accident?.
5. Do you think a VTSO should be held accountable if an accident takes place at port
approaches?.
6. Do you think regulating VTS to International standard can better mitigate maritime
accidents at port approaches?
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Appendix I: Shipboard officers feedback compilation matrix
Shipboard officers questionnaire feedback compilation (Master copy)
What are the risk when approaching port area (P.Stn) from sea?

Q1
Item / Particpents
Rank on board
Age
Region (Nationality)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22
%

a

Busy VHF Com. Channel

0

0.0

b

Lack of VTS area Info.

0

0.0

c

Local Shipping traffic density

0

0.0

d

VTSO English ability

0

0.0

e

Ship's staff VTS awareness /expectation

0

0.0

f

VTS ship's awarness / expectations

0

0.0

g

master / officer area experience

0

0.0

Others

What would be factors to evalute the performance of a VTS centre?

Q2
Item / Particpents

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22

a

Vessel traking/moitering and warning

0

0.0

b

Number of incidents and near misses

0

0.0

c

risk analysis for VTS area

0

0.0

d

avilability of standard operation procedures

0

0.0

0

0.0

0
0
0

0.0
0.0
0.0

0
0

0.0
0.0

Others
*

Do you see the VTSO communication pre-fix as a contributor in incident development at port approaches?

Q3

Item / Particpents

1

response to question only

0

Item / Particpents
b
c

5

6

7

8

9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22

Do you think a VTSO should be held accountable if an accident takes place?
Item / Particpents

b

4

Safety advices/information
traffic organisation instructions
navigational assistance

Q5

a

3

Do you trust information given to you by VTS centre regarding ?

Q4

a

2

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Inside VTS area
Outside VTS area

Source: Author,2011
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Appendix I.01: Questionnaire results frequency distribution summary table
Frequancy Distribution Summary
10.09.2011
Items

Qst / Rank
No. of Participents

Ranks on board
Sum
Master Chief Second Third
0

Age Group
A

B

C

Sum

Regions
FE ME EU

A

ISC

Sum

0

0

a Busy VHF Com. Channel

0

0

0

b Lack of VTS area Info.

0

0

0

c Local Shipping traffic density

0

0

0

0

0

0

e Ship's staff VTS awareness /expectation

0

0

0

f VTS ship's awarness / expectations

0

0

0

g master / officer area experience

0

0

0

a Vessel traking/moitering and warning

0

0

0

b Number of incidents and near misses

0

0

0

c risk analysis for VTS area

0

0

0

d avilability of standard operation procedures

0

0

0

response to question only

0

0

0

a Safety advices/information

0

0

0

Q4 b traffic organisation instructions

0

0

0

c navigational assistance

0

0

0

a Inside VTS area

0

0

0

b Outside VTS area

0

Q 1 d VTSO English ability

Q2

Q3

Q5

said
0 both

Source: Author,2011

The above table shows the number of participants who said yes to the proposed factors.
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Appendix I.02: Questionnaire results distribution chart

Source: Author,2011
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Appendix I.03: Seafarers region results distribution chart

Source: Author,2011

95

Appendix I.04: Age distribution and results chart

Source: Author,2011
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Appendix I.05: Masters‘ response analysis table
Master (M)

Answers
Qst / Rank

Y

Age Group
A (23 - 26) B (27 - 35) C (35 +)

Total

FE

ME

Regions
EU A

ISC others

No. of Participents
a

Busy VHF Com. Channel

b

Lack of VTS area Info.

c

Local Shipping traffic density

Q1 d

Q2

Ship's staff VTS awareness /expectation

f

VTS ship's awarness / expectations

g

master / officer area experience

a

Vessel traking/moitering and warning

b

Number of incidents and near misses

c

risk analysis for VTS area

d

avilability of standard operation procedures

Q3

response to question only
a

Q4 b

Q5

Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q5

VTSO English ability

e

Safety advices/information
traffic organisation instructions

c

navigational assistance

a

Inside VTS area

b

Outside VTS area

What are the risk when approaching port area (P.Stn) from sea?
What would be factors to evalute the performance of a VTS centre?
Do you see the VTSO communication pre-fix as a contributor in incident development at port approaches?
Do you see the VTSO communication pre-fix as a contributor in incident development at port approaches?
Do you think a VTSO should be held accountable if an accident takes place?
Source: Author,2011

The above table shows analysis to research questionnaire answers received from ships‘ masters.
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Appendix I.06: Chief officers‘ response analysis table
Chief ( C )

Answers
Qst / Rank

Total

Age Group
Y

A (23 - 26) B (27 - 35) C (35 +)

Regions
FE

No. of Participents
a

Busy VHF Com. Channel

b

Lack of VTS area Info.

c

Local Shipping traffic density

Q1 d

Q2

VTSO English ability

e

Ship's staff VTS awareness /expectation

f

VTS ship's awarness / expectations

g

master / officer area experience

a

Vessel traking/moitering and warning

b

Number of incidents and near misses

c

risk analysis for VTS area

d

avilability of standard operation procedures

Q3

response to question only

a
Q4 b

Safety advices/information

Q5

Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q5

traffic organisation instructions

c

navigational assistance

a

Inside VTS area

b

Outside VTS area

What are the risk when approaching port area (P.Stn) from sea?
What would be factors to evalute the performance of a VTS centre?
Do you see the VTSO communication pre-fix as a contributor in incident development at port approaches?
Do you see the VTSO communication pre-fix as a contributor in incident development at port approaches?
Do you think a VTSO should be held accountable if an accident takes place?

Source: Author,2011

98

5

ME

EU

A

ISC others

Appendix I.07: Second officers‘ response analysis table
Second (S)
Answers
Qst / Rank

Total
Age Group

Y

A (23 - 26) B (27 - 35) C (35 +)

Regions
FE

No. of Participents
a

Busy VHF Com. Channel

b

Lack of VTS area Info.

c

Local Shipping traffic density

Q1 d

Q2

Ship's staff VTS awareness /expectation

f

VTS ship's awarness / expectations

g

master / officer area experience

a

Vessel traking/moitering and warning

b

Number of incidents and near misses

c

risk analysis for VTS area

d

avilability of standard operation procedures

Q3

response to question only
a

Q4 b

Q5

Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q5

VTSO English ability

e

Safety advices/information
traffic organisation instructions

c

navigational assistance

a

Inside VTS area

b

Outside VTS area

What are the risk when approaching port area (P.Stn) from sea?
What would be factors to evalute the performance of a VTS centre?
Do you see the VTSO communication pre-fix as a contributor in incident development at port approaches?
Do you see the VTSO communication pre-fix as a contributor in incident development at port approaches?
Do you think a VTSO should be held accountable if an accident takes place?

Source: Author,2011
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Appendix I.08: Third officers‘ response analysis table
Third (T)
Answers
Qst / Rank

Total
Age Group

Y

A (23 - 26) B (27 - 35) C (35 +)

Regions
FE

No. of Participents
a

Busy VHF Com. Channel

b

Lack of VTS area Info.

c

Local Shipping traffic density

Q1 d

Q2

Ship's staff VTS awareness /expectation

f

VTS ship's awarness / expectations

g

master / officer area experience

a

Vessel traking/moitering and warning

b

Number of incidents and near misses

c

risk analysis for VTS area

d

avilability of standard operation procedures

Q3

response to question only
a

Q4 b

Q5

Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q5

VTSO English ability

e

Safety advices/information
traffic organisation instructions

c

navigational assistance

a

Inside VTS area

b

Outside VTS area

What are the risk when approaching port area (P.Stn) from sea?
What would be factors to evalute the performance of a VTS centre?
Do you see the VTSO communication pre-fix as a contributor in incident development at port approaches?
Do you see the VTSO communication pre-fix as a contributor in incident development at port approaches?
Do you think a VTSO should be held accountable if an accident takes place?

Source: Author,2011
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Appendix J: Summary table of VTS centers‘ answer to questionnaire

Other findings
Summary of VTS centers / Competent Authorities
Region
No. Participants
No. of available VTS
No. of Regulated VTS
Training Requirements
Licensing of VTSO
VTS Responsibilities
Measures of KPI
Bench Mark VTS
Public management
Private management
Published at National level
The IMO

ME A EU FE Ca

Sum Remarks

Availability of
National regulation
for VTS activities
Responsibility of VTS
Operation
Announcement Of
VTS Centers at

ME ; Kuwait, Bahrain, UAE,
Qatar.

A; Kenya, Nigeria, Benin
EU; Norway, Denmark,
Sweden, Rotterdam,

FE; Hong Kong, Malysia
C; Canada
Source: Author, 2011

For the purpose of this research, regions have been identified as given in the table above,
the researcher is aware that there is another ―Geographical region and composition‖ as
defined by the UN, found at http://unstats.un.org/unsd/methods/m49/m49regin.htm .
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Appendix J.01: VTS centers‘ questionnaire result distribution chart

Source: Author, 2011
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Appendix K: VTS centers‘ questionnaire feedback compilation table

VTS centre / Competent Authority / Maritime Administartion feedback
How VTS centres do you have? And what type are they?

Q1
Item / Particpents
Region

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17

a No. of VTS
b Type of VTS or LPS
Q2

14
0
0

Do regulation exist in your national law regarding VTS centres, VTS personals ashighlighted below and VTS area?
Item / Particpents

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9 10 11 12 13 14

a

Training requirments
b Licensing of VTSO
c VTS responsibilities / obligation
d Measures (KPI) to evaluate VTS
Others
*

0
0
0
0

How do you benchmark (KPI) the quality of your VTS/

Q3
Item / Particpents

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9 10 11 12 13 14

response to question only Txt

0

Who is responsible for VTS operation?

Q4
Item / Particpents

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9 10 11 12 13

a Public sector (CG, Port authority,etc)
b Privite Sector (port operator / oil terminal,etc

0
0

Are all VTS centres published at

Q5
Item / Particpents

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

a

National level (within the law / reg)
b the IMO

8

9 10 11 12 13 14
0
0

Yes

1

No

Source: Author, 2011
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